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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
In recent years many law schools have instituted loan repayment 
assistance programs (LRAPs) intended to encourage law graduates to work 
in public interest areas such as legal aid. 1 The typical LRAP provides for 
cancellation of some part of the student's educational loans for each year 
of such public interest work, or for work in any law-related area if the 
graduate earns less than a ceiling amount. Schools provide the LRAP 
benefits either by direct cancellation of the original loans, or if the loans 
are in the hands of a third party, by periodic cash payments to the 
participant to be used to pay down the original loans. The cash payments 
may be structured either as outright grants or as new cancelable loans. 
The purpose of LRAPs is to assist lawyers who would like to pursue 
public interest careers but would otherwise be forced into more 
remunerative private practice in order to support the crushing burden of 
servicing student loans. 
This article addresses the question whether LRAP benefits are taxable 
as income. The question is unresolved, and to some extent even unasked, 
but it is becoming increasingly important as the number and size of legal 
LRAPs continue to expand. 2 
Although there is no published authority regarding the tax effects of 
LRAPs for legal education,3 most if not all of the law schools which offer 
LRAPs have assumed that the financial assistance is taxable income to the 
participant. No law school or LRAP participant seems to have challenged 
this interpretation. Many national law schools report the financial 
assistance as income by sending 1099 Information Forms to participants 
1. Loan Repayment Assistance Creating Opportunities for Public Interest Careers, 
NAPIL CLOSE-UP (Nat'I Ass'n for Pub. Interest Law, Washington, D.C.}, Fall 1994, 
at 3 (reporting that 49 Jaw schools now have such programs). In addition, six states have 
LRAP programs funded by state bar foundations, state interest on lawyers' trust accounts 
programs, or direct state legislative funding. Id. 
2. New York University (NYU) School of Law began a $10,000,000 program in the 
fall of 1995 which can pay the entire cost of a law student's education, worth as much 
as $40,000 per year, if the graduate r.emains in public interest law for 10 years. The 
program is large enough to accommodate half of the entering class of 420 students for 
the years 1995, 1996, and 1997. See William Celis 3d, Tuition for Public Service Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at A25. 
3. Except for a 1991 law review article. See J. Timothy Phillips & Timothy G. 
Hatfield, Uncle Sam Gets the Goldmine-Students Get the Shaft: Federal Tax Treatment 
of Student Loan Forgiveness, 15 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 249 (1991). The article 
concluded that law school LRAPs are probably taxable; however, the analysis is brief 
and does not refer to the historical sources relied upon in this article. 
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and to the IRS.4 Information reporting is clearly not required if LRAPs 
are a form of scholarship, however, even if they are a taxable form of 
scholarship.5 This article concludes that LRAP benefits should be 
regarded as tax-free scholarships at least to the extent they are allocable 
to law school tuition loans. 
The widespread belief that LRAP benefits are taxable is apparently 
due to two related sources. First, LRAPs do not meet the literal 
requirement of I.R.C. § 108(f)(l) which allows exclusion of student loan 
cancellations that are conditioned upon the student's employment in certain 
professions or designated areas but only if the source of the LRAP loan 
funds is a governmental entity. The source of law school LRAP funds is 
largely private. If one assumes that I.R.C. § 108(f) is the exclusive route 
to protection for student loan forgiveness, LRAP benefits would be 
taxable. 
The second source is Revenue Ruling 73-256,6 which held that 
forgiveness of state-provided medical school loans is taxable if conditioned 
upon the graduate's practicing medicine for a term of years in an 
underserved area of the state. The IRS held that the LRAP failed the test 
of Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4( c) which provides that a scholarship is 
taxable if the student must perform substantial future services, or if the 
primary beneficiary of the scholarship is the grantor. The Supreme 
4. For example, NYU Law School's 1994-95 information brochure describing the 
Melvyn and Barbara Weiss Loan Repayment Assistance Program flatly states that "LRAP 
proceeds are taxable as 'other income'" and that the University will mail participants a 
Form 1099. NYU's assistance takes the form of cash payments to the participant who 
is required to use the funds to pay down loans. Harvard and Yale Law Schools also pay 
cash and also send Forms 1099. Columbia School of Law makes participants new 
interim cancelable loans to pay down existing debt, and when the interim loans are 
canceled, Columbia also sends Forms 1099. By contrast, certain other law schools which 
use the interim loan system do not send Forms 1099 when the interim loans are forgiven. 
These schools did not wish to be mentioned here. 
5. I.R.S. Notice 87-31, 1987-1C.B.475 states very clearly that unless a scholarship 
is treated as wages under I.R.C. § 117(c) and wage withholding is required, no Form 
1099 need be filed. Id. at 477. See also Announcement 93-2, 1993 I.R.B. 39, § 342.9 
(same). Thus even where part of a scholarship is clearly taxable, such as amounts for 
living expenses rather than tuition, the school is expressly exempted from information 
reporting. It is clear that LRAP participants are not employees of their law school. If 
LRAPs do not qualify as tax-free scholarships, they are at least arguably "scholarships," 
and it is the responsibility of the recipient, not the grantor, to determine whether a 
scholarship is taxable. Id. at 478; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T OF THE 
TREASURY, PUB. No. 520, SCHOLARSlllPS AND FELLOWSHIPS 3 (1994). 
6. 1973-1 C.B. 56, discussed and criticized infra notes 65-67, 156-161 and 
accompanying text. 
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Court's decision in Bingler v. Johnson' is usually cited as upholding these 
regulations and interpreting them as imposing a quid pro quo test. 
It was evidently for these reasons that when Senators Bumpers and 
Danforth introduced a bill in 1993 which was intended to make law-school 
LRAPs tax-free,8 they too asserted that legal LRAPs are taxable under 
current law.9 No action was· taken on the bill, 10 which would have 
amended l.R.C. § 108(f) essentially by deleting the current requirement 
that the source of loan funds must be a government entity .1 1 
Senator Bumpers stated that no tax policy supports treating privately-
funded LRAPs differently from publicly-funded ones, and pointed out that 
the sole reason for the limitation in current l.R.C. § 108(f) appears to be 
the absence of any privately-funded LRAPs during the mid-1970's when 
the provision was enacted. 12 The bill would merely bring l.R.C. § 
108(f) up to date, and would not represent any departure from existing tax 
policy .'3 The bill died in 1993 without any action having been taken and 
has not been reintroduced. The forecast for a legislative resolution seems 
dim. 
7. 394 U.S. 741 (1969) (holding that engineers employed by Westinghouse 
Corporation who received 70-90% of regular salary while on nine month leave to 
complete doctoral dissertation received taxable income-not excludible 
fellowships-where stipends were withheld upon as salaries, taxpayers continued to 
receive employee benefits during leave, and had agreed to return to Westinghouse's 
employment for at least two years after leave). 
8. S. 914, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1993). 
9. 139 CONG. REC. S5647 (daily ed. May 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). 
10. Although according to Senator Bumpers, the bill is strongly supported by the 
American Bar Association, the National Senior Citizens Law Center, the National 
Association for Public Interest Law, the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association, 
the National Associ;ition for Law Placement, the Project Advisory Group, and the 
Association of American Law Schools. Id. at S5648. 
11. Although S. 914, supra note 8, is primarily aimed at law school loan 
forgiveness, it would apply to a number of other professions as well. Senator Bumpers 
stated that LRAPs are now available at the Kennedy School of Government, and the 
Harvard and Stanford Business Schools. 139 CONG. REc. S5648 (daily ed. May 6, 
1993) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). 
12. 139 CONG. REc. S5647 (daily ed. May 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). 
The statement seems accurate. Harvard was the first law school to introduce an LRAP 
in 1974, and for the following 12 years Harvard was virtually alone. The idea began to 
catch on at other schools after 1985. See Student Loans: Be Good, ECONOMIST, Nov. 
11, 1989, at 36. 
13. 139 CONG. REC. S5648 (daily ed. May 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). 
The Joint Committee on Taxation found that any revenue loss from the bill would be 
negligible. 
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The belief that LRAPs are taxable was bolstered by the Tax Court's 
1993 decision in Porten v. Commissioner14 which held that forgiveness 
of college tuition loans granted by the State of Alaska is taxable where 
conditioned upon the graduate's continuing residency in the state, citing 
as support Revenue Ruling 73-256. The court also held that l.R.C. § 
108(f) is preemptive of the LRAP area and that the Alaska plan did not fit 
the literal terms of l.R.C. § 108(f) because it was not limited to "certain 
professions." 
I disagree with the Porten court's conclusions which are based upon 
excessive deference to Revenue Ruling 73-256 and upon a failure to 
explore the IRS' earlier and sounder position on the same issue. 15 It 
appears to be forgotten now that for thirteen years, until its abrupt and 
unexplained change of position in Revenue Ruling 73-256, the IRS had 
held that the medical LRAP and other similar LRAPs for higher education 
were tax-free scholarships because the public-service requirement was not 
for the benefit of the grantor, but rather for the public at large so that the 
service requirement was not compensatory in nature. The IRS explained 
its change of position in Revenue Ruling 73-256 as compelled by Bingler 
v. Johnson, but in fact nothing in the Johnson decision required 
reconsideration of the earlier LRAP rulings. 
Also forgotten is the fact that Congress explicitly disapproved both the 
reasoning and result of Revenue Ruling 73-256. In fact, Congress enacted 
the predecessor of l.R.C. § 108(f) expressly in order to overrule Revenue 
Ruling 73-256 and to reinstate the tax-free status of these and similar 
LRAPs as scholarships. 16 This history casts considerable doubt both 
upon the authority of Revenue Ruling 73-256, and upon the theory that 
Congress intended l.R.C. § 108(f) to be preemptive of the area of student 
loan relief. 
Recently the IRS seems to have drifted back to its former position that 
public-service requirements are noncompensatory. In Private Letter Ruling 
(PLR) 9526020, 17 the IRS ruled that an outright grant of law school 
tuition is a tax-free scholarship even if the recipient is contractually 
obligated to work in public interest law for ten years and must pay a 
penalty for breach of the condition. There is no difference of substance 
between such a grant and a tuition loan which is cancelable under the 
same conditions. And except for timing, about which the IRS has never 
14. 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1994 (1993). This is the sole reported court decision 
regarding LRAPs of any kind. The decision is criticized infra notes 115-134 and 139-
149. 
15. See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 68-72 and 131-134 and accompanying text. 
17. Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 9526020 (Apr. 3, 1995). This is the only ruling which addresses 
a law school LRAP. 
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made an issue, there is little or no difference between either of these and 
postgraduate LRAP cash payments which are intended to pay for tuition 
loans. Indeed, if a proper request were made, the IRS might even issue 
a favorable ruling. 
This article will examine afresh the question whether law school 
LRAPs may be tax-free scholarships or rebates of tuition for reasons 
which have escaped those who have assumed the IRS' position on the 
question. Part II of this article provides background on the nature and 
purpose of LRAPs and on the history of their tax treatment. Part III 
analyzes this tax treatment and argues that LRAPs are not taxable under 
current law, at least to the extent the benefits are allocable to relief from 
law school tuition loans, on the ground that in the final analysis, LRAP 
benefits are simply rebates of tuition. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Nature and Purpose of LRAPs 
All law school LRAPs have as their common purpose the 
advancement of public interest law by means of financial aid to graduates 
to offset the high cost of law school and low remuneration of public 
interest work. 18 Both factors have exacerbated a persistent shortage of 
public interest lawyers. 19 The National Association for Public Interest 
Law (NAPIL) reports that in 1991-92, more than 50% of law school 
graduates left school owing between $40,000 and $79,999. Starting 
salaries in the public interest sector declined from a median of $32,000 in 
18. Not all observers agree that law school LRAPs are desirable, however. See 
generally Luize E. Zubrow, Is Loan Forgiveness Divine? Another View, 59 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 451 (1991). Professor Zubrow argues that LRAPs may encourage increased 
student indebtedness and unfairly reward borrowers at the expense of savers. She 
contends that if LRAPs are desirable at all, they should be confined to subsidizing· legal 
aid to the poor and should not be available for public-issue advocacy work or for 
government employees. She further maintains that LRAPs are an inefficient means of 
providing aid to the poor, and that direct grants to legal aid societies or the establishment 
of fellowships would be more efficient. However, Professor Zubrow appears to assume, 
in her economic analysis, that LRAPs are taxable to the participants. Finally, Professor 
Zubrow questions whether encouragement of public interest law of any kind is a proper 
function of law schools except where it directly contributes to the education of students, 
such as aid provided through live student clinics. 
19. See William P. Hoyle, High Cost of Doing Good, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 96 
(discussing the need for more LRAP programs to alleviate the shortage of public interest 
lawyers and urging the institution of a comprehensive federally funded plan. Such an 
LRAP program would presumably be tax-free under current I.R.C. § 108(t) because it 
is federally funded.). 
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1989 to $27,000 in 1993.20 Most graduates cannot afford to set aside 
more than 10 % of their annual income for student loan repayment. 21 
According to this formula, law students who have educational debts of 
$40,000 need an annual income of over $60,000 in order to repay the 
loans during the usual 10-year repayment period.22 
All LRAPs are need-based both at the time of making the initial loan 
or grant during law school, and again at the time the aid is actually 
granted, generally by means of imposing income and net-worth ceilings 
as a qualification for relief. 23 There is great variety among LRAPs 
regarding other conditions for participation. Many plans condition 
eligibility upon employment by non-profit tax-exempt entities such as legal 
aid corporations; other plans include positions with federal, state or local 
governments as well, but exclude judicial clerkships; still others include 
judicial clerkships and even private-firm employment provided that a 
substantial percentage of the participant's work is spent on public interest 
or pro-bono cases (e.g., Northeastern and Tulane); and some have 
expanded participation to include "all law-related· employment. "24 At 
NYU, Harvard, and Yale, eligibility is solely need-based and is measured 
by compensation ceilings. 25 
The method of dispensing the financial aid also varies widely. When 
the law school is itself the lender and holds the graduate's note, relief 
takes the form of periodically reducing part of the principal and interest 
owed. 26 When the note is held by a third party lender, as is more usual, 
the law school may either: (1) pay the participant periodic cash amounts 
with which to pay down the original loan; or (2) make periodic cancelable 
interim loans to the participant for the same purpose; or (3) make 
payments directly to the original lender on the participant's behalf. Many 
law school LRAPs include repayment of undergraduate loans as well. 27 
20. See Loan Repayment Assistance Creating Opportunities for Public Interest 




23. See generally NATIONAL Ass'N FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, THE NAPIL LOAN 
REPAYMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REPORT (rev. ed. 1994) [hereinafter NAPIL 
REPORT]. 
24. See Loan Repayment Assistance Creating Opportunities for Public Interest 
Careers, supra note l, at 3. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 4-5. 
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Some LRAP programs even pay extra amounts intended to defray the 
participant's real or imagined income tax burden on the basic LRAP 
benefits.28 
Due to the great variety of existing and possible LRAPs, including 
those used to finance undergraduate education as well as medical and other 
professional training, this article does not purport to address the tax 
treatment of each and every one, but rather it is limited to the reported 
authorities and to general principles. 
B. History of Tax Exclusion for Scholarships 
Before 1954, although no specific Internal Revenue Code provision 
governed scholarships, they were excludible under the general provision 
exempting gifts. Like other gifts, scholarships were not excludible if they 
were in effect a disguised method of providing compensation for services. 
The IRS ruled in 1951 that an educational grant was an excludible gift if 
it provided "for the training and education of an individual, either as part 
of his program in acquiring a degree or in otherwise furthering his 
educational development, no services being rendered as compensation 
therefor. "29 
When Congress enacted I.R.C. § 117 in 1954 as a specific exclusion 
for scholarships, it did not intend to limit the exclusion under prior law, 
but rather to expand its scope30 and to provide a bright-line rule to avoid 
28. NYU, Harvard, and Yale all provide such assistance for income taxes, despite 
uncertainty whether any tax is actually owed. Harvard pays a fixed additional 25%, and 
both NYU and Yale pay an additional 39% to compensate for the fact that the tax 
reimbursements are themselves taxable under Old Colony Trust v. Commissioner, 279 
U.S. 716 (1929) (holding that employer's payment of employee's income taxes was 
additional compensation taxable to the employee). 
The National Health Service Corps Loan Repayment Program which finances 
medical education similarly makes additional payments to the recipient of 39% (or more 
if appropriate) as an estimated reimbursement for the tax liability to the recipient. 42 
U.S.C. § 2541-l(g)(c)(3)(a) (1994). The IRS has ruled this program to be taxable, 
although the correctness of the ruling may be doubted. See infra notes 107-112 and 
accompanying text. 
29. I.T. 4056, 1951-2 C.B. 8, declared obsolete by Rev. Ru!. 69-43, 1969-1 C.B. 
310. 
30. One of the purposes ofI.R.C. § 117 was to preserve the scholarship exclusion 
from the possible consequences of the Supreme Court's 1952 decision regarding prizes 
and awards in Robertson v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 711 (1952) (holding that cash 
award provided by philanthropist for best symphonic work submitted in contest was not 
an excludible gift but payment for services pursuant to offer and acceptance of contract, 
despite lack of any economic benefit to philanthropist). Until 1954, prizes and awards 
had also been excludible under the general provision for gifts. In 1954, Congress 
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the voluminous and troublesome case-by-case litigation under prior law 
over whether a given educational grant was made with donative intent. 31 
Under the 1954 version of l.R.C. § 117, it became immaterial that a 
degree candidate performed teaching or research services if such services 
were required for all degree candidates. 32 Nondegree candidates were 
limited to an exclusion of $300 per month for an aggregate total of 36 
months. 
The aim of providing a bright-line rule was not achieved, however, 
partly because Congress failed to define the terms "scholarship" and 
enacted the Robertson holding into new I.R.C. § 74 so that the exclusion of awards 
would apply to past achievements but not to accomplishments performed in order to 
compete for an award. Congress protected I.R.C. § 117 from the reach of Robertson, 
however, by specifically providing that if a grant was both a prize and a scholarship it 
is treated under I.R.C. § 117 so that scholarships which are awarded competitively on 
the basis of scholastic merit would continue to enjoy the exclusion. See 1 BORIS I. 
BIITKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES 
AND GIFTS, 11.2.1 (2d ed. 1989). 
31. The House Committee Report states that: 
The basic ruling of the Internal Revenue Service which states that the amount 
of a grant or fellowship is includible in gross income unless it can be 
established to be a gift provides no clear-cut method of distinguishing between 
taxable and nontaxable grants. Hence, the tax status of these grants presently 
must be decided on a case-by-case method. 
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954). 
32. The rule was designed to liberalize pre-1954 law which Congress felt too often 
resulted in taxing scholarships of students who performed teaching and research. The 
House Report explained: 
When the scholarships and fellowships are granted subject to the 
performance of teaching or research services, the exclusion is not to apply to 
that portion which represents payments which are in effect a wage or salary. 
The amount included will be determined by reference to the going rates of pay 
for similar services. This allocation of the amount of the grant between 
taxable and nontaxable portions represents more liberal treatment than is 
allowed under present practice. Present law taxes the grant in its entirety 
unless services required of the recipient are nomjnal. 
This limitation on the exclusion will not result in the taxation of the 
portion of the grant which involves research or teaching services performed 
primarily for the training and education of the recipient. 
Id. at 17. The Senate version of the bill, which was the version actually enacted, added 
"other services" to the "teaching or research" covered by the House version, but 
liberalized the House version still further by providing that "if teaching, research, or 
other services are required of all candidates for a particular degree (whether or not 
recipients of scholarship or fellowship grants) such services are not to be regarded as 
part-time employment." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1954). It seems 
clear that all the services referred to in both versions concerned only those performed 
directly for the grantor institution. 
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"fellowship," and also because the Treasury promulgated regulations 
under new I.R.C. § 117 which reintroduced the old donative-intent test in 
a new guise. 33 The result was continued if not increased case-by-case 
litigation and growing uncertainty. Most of the difficulties involved 
medically-related disciplines where on-the-job training for degrees or 
specialty licensing and stipends for post-graduate research advanced the 
recipients' education while at the same time benefitting hospitals or other 
institutional grantors.34 Many commentators observed that the 1954 
legislation as interpreted by the Treasury Regulations was hardly 
distinguishable from the law which prevailed under the 1939 Code.35 
The scholarship exclusion under I.R.C. § 117 was substantially 
eroded in 1986. Congress repealed the exemption for teaching, research 
or other services which are required for all degree candidates whether or 
not on scholarship, thus making scholarships taxable to the extent of the 
value of all such services provided. In addition, Congress repealed the 
exclusion for fellowships for non-degree candidates altogether, 36 thus 
ending the flood of litigation over postgraduate stipends for medical 
residents and fellows. Most importantly, Congress limited the exclusion 
33. These regulations provided that the scholarship exclusion did not apply to any 
grant which "(1) . . . represents either compensation for past, present, or future 
employment services or represents payment for services which are subject to the direction 
or supervision of the grantor[, or] (2) •.. [is for] studies or research primarily for the 
benefit of the grantor." Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (1956). 
34. For details of the immense body of inconsistent decisions and rulings, see, e.g., 
Donald H. Gordon, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants as Income: A Search for Treasury 
Policy, 1960 WASH. U. L.Q. 144, 144-51 (1960); William W. Stuart, Tax Status of 
Scholarship and Fellowship Grants: Frustration of Legislative Purpose and Approaches 
to Obtain the Exclusion Granted By Congress, 25 EMORY L.J. 357, 360 (1976); Mary 
Ann Tucker, Federal Income Taxation of Scholarships and Fellowships: A Practical 
Analysis, 8 IND. L. REV. 749, 756 (1975). The basic problem with the "primary 
purpose" or "benefit" test is that all grants result in some benefit to both grantor and 
grantee and the regulations fail to specify in any detail how the relative benefits are to 
be weighted. As a result, the courts reached conflicting decisions. See Stuart, supra, at 
367. 
35. See Stuart, supra note 34, at 376, 379-85 and sources cited therein (discussing 
that at least since Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969), the compensation versus gift 
(or quid pro quo) issue has been the primary test of scholarship status and the analysis 
is essentially the same as the unsatisfactory approach under the 1939 Code which 
Congress attempted to eliminate in 1954); see also Gordon, supra note 34, at 151 
(observing that due to the Treasury's position, the 1954 reform resulted in little change 
from prior law, and rightly complaining that the Treasury's focus on the narrow gift 
versus compensation issue failed to recognize the essentially unique nature of educational 
grants). 
36. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 123, 100 Stat. 2085, 2112 
(codified at I.R.C. § 117(a) (1994)). 
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for degree candidates to amounts for qualified tuition and related expenses 
and made all grants for living expenses taxable. 37 Thus it must be 
remembered in the following discussion that pre-1987 tax law remains 
applicable only to the extent of tuition and related expenses of degree 
candidates. 
C. Pre-Bingler v. Johnson Tax Exclusion for LRAPs 
The first IRS pronouncement on the subject of LRAPs was PLR 
5604265200A38 which held taxable a state-funded LRAP under which 
medical school loans were forgiven over a five-year period if the student 
practiced medicine in a rural area of Mississippi. The ruling, which 
concerned itself principally with the timing of the income, did not explain 
why the LRAP was taxable, and apparently assumed that the LRAP was 
either compensation or income from cancellation of indebtedness. The 
ruling also held that the Mississippi plan could not qualify as a scholarship 
because it was in the form of a loan. The ruling noted that "[i]nasmuch 
as amounts received under the program are loans, and inasmuch as they 
must be repaid (either in cash or by service), they cannot be considered 
scholarship payments exempt from tax under section 117 of the Code. "39 
Two years after PLR 5604265200A, the taxpayer requested the IRS 
to reconsider, and it did so in PLR 5807039700A 40 which came to the 
opposite conclusion and revoked the earlier ruling. The second PLR was 
based upon General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) 30,70041 which 
determined that the Mississippi plan was a scholarship and excludible 
under l.R.C. § 117. GCM 30,700 reasoned that the state was neither the 
employer of the grantee nor had the right to direct or supervise the 
grantee's practice of medicine. The requirement of practicing in a rural 
area was simply a condition of the gift which was intended to ensure that 
the primary purpose of the plan would be carried out, and was in no way 
intended as compensation. In other words, the LRAP was held to be a 
scholarship with a noncompensatory condition subsequent. 
GCM 30,700 also prophetically suggested that "[t]he Assistant 
Commissioner may wish to consider whether as a matter of policy it 
would not be desirable to reach an answer favorable to the taxpayers in 
37. I.R.C. § 117(b) (1994). 
38. Apr. 26, 1956, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File. 
39. Id. 
40. July 3, 1958, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File. 
41. May 27, 1958, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File. 
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this case because of the virtual certainty of relief legislation and the 
probable loss of the issue in the event of litigation. "42 
The next ruling on LRAPs was PLR 6004275330A, 43 which 
concerned loans under the National Defense Education Act of 195844 
(NDEA) which were forgiven if the recipient performed teaching or 
research afterwards. The ruling followed the reasoning of GCM 30,700. 
As a result of national concern, if not panic, over the state of American 
education in the wake of the Russian scientific achievement with Sputnik, 
the NDEA established a variety of LRAPs designed to encourage talented 
individuals to study and work in educational fields designated by the 
government. The federal government provided NDEA educational loans 
for students who planned to become elementary or high-school teachers, 
and for especially talented students to engage in advanced study in the 
sciences and foreign languages. The typical loan agreement called for 
cancellation of 10 % of the loan for each year of teaching or research up 
to a maximum of 50% of the loan principal. 
In PLR 6004275330A, the IRS ruled that this loan forgiveness was a 
tax-free scholarship. The specific program concerned NDEA loan 
contracts designed to enable graduate students in engineering to pursue a 
doctoral degree and which were partially forgiven if the graduate engaged 
in full-time teaching. After reciting Treasury Regulation § 1.117-
4(c)(l),45 the IRS held that the loan forgiveness feature was outside these 
restrictions. The reasoning of PLR 6004275330A is instructive: 
There has been no employment relationship between the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which administers 
Title II of the Act, and the recipient of a loan under that Act; 
therefore, payments made pursuant thereto cannot be said to 
represent compensation for past, present, or future services. The 
manner in which recipients of loans under this program perform 
their teaching duties, after graduation, is in no way subject to the 
direction or supervision either by the grantor or the recipient's 
institution of learning. Only a reasonable condition is imposed 
upon the recipients of the Title II loans, which is to insure that 
the interests of the nation are adequately safeguarded, in requiring 
teaching services after completion of their education in partial 
cancellation of loans granted to them. 
42. Id. There was no litigation, but the prediction of relief legislation proved correct 
when Congress enacted I.R.C. § 108(f). See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
43. Apr. 27, 1960, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File. 
44. Pub. L. No. 85-864, §§ 201-209, 72 Stat. 1580, 1584-86. 
45. Supra note 33. 
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. The conditions imposed under that program, as to the 
forgiveness-of-loans, have been considered to be merely 
contingent and not materially affecting the real nature of the 
grants which are provided by Congress primarily for the 
education and training of the student-recipients thereof. 46 
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The following year, GCM 31,87147 came to the same conclusion as 
PLR 6004275330A regarding an NDEA loan which was partially forgiven 
if the student taught in an elementary or secondary school anywhere in the 
United States.48 Thus the IRS regarded such conditional scholarships as 
a kind of matching grant in which the grantor(s) advance funds (or forgive 
prior ~dvances) to students on condition that they subsequently employ the 
education to provide a matching grant of services primarily for the benefit 
of some broad segment of the public. 
For the next thirteen years there were no further developments and the 
law seemed clear and settled that public-interest LRAPs are tax-free 
scholarships. Then, in 1972, the IRS suddenly and unaccountably 
reversed its position. 49 It did so in purported reliance upon the Supreme 
Court's 1969 decision in Bingler v. Johnson.50 Although Johnson did not 
concern an LRAP, it is the leading decision in the area of scholarships and 
will be described next before resuming the story of LRAPs in the 
following section. 
46. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6004275330A (Apr. 27, 1960), available in LEXIS, Fedtax 
Library, RELS File. 
47. Jan. 19, 1961, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File. 
48. The IRS reached similar conclusions regarding NDEA direct stipends as opposed 
to LRAPs. For example, in Revenue Ruling 62-205, NDEA stipends for both degree and 
nondegree candidates attending training institutes for student guidance and counseling, 
and for modern foreign language instruction, were held tax-free scholarships on the 
ground that the recipients owed no service either to the educational institution or to the 
government. See Rev. Rul. 62-205, 1962-2 C.B. 43, 44-45. 
On the other hand, where the recipients were paid NDEA project funds administered 
by a college in return for specific services under the direction of the college to develop 
and evaluate new techniques for the instruction of ninth-grade algebra, and the college 
itself treated the amounts as "salaries," the amounts were held taxable. See Rev. Rul. 
61-174, 1961-2 C.B. 28, 29. 
49. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,498 (May 17, 1971), available in LEXIS, Fedtax 
Library, RELS File. 
50. 394 U.S. 741 (1969). 
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D. Bingler v. Johnson 
By 1969, growing confusion over the taxation of employer-provided 
paid educational leave led to a split in the Courts of Appeal which was 
resolved by the Supreme Court in Bingler v. Johnson. The taxpayer was 
an engineer who took a nine-month paid leave to complete his doctorate 
in engineering while he remained on the Westinghouse payroll as an 
employee and was obligated to return to full-time employment at 
Westinghouse for at least two years at the end of his leave. The taxpayer 
unsuccessfully challenged Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4(c)51 on the 
ground that Congress had placed no limit on the dollar amount of 
scholarships for degree candidates, and had enacted I.R.C. § 117 in order 
to avoid the kind of case-by-case determinations of donative intent 
necessary under the challenged regulation.52 The Johnson Court held 
that "[t]he thrust of the provision dealing with compensation [Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.117-4(c)] is that bargained-for payments, given only as a 'quo' in 
return for the quid of services rendered-whether past, present, or 
future-should not be excludable from income as 'scholarship' funds. 
That provision clearly covers this case. "53 Immediately preceding the 
last sentence of the above passage, footnote 32 of Johnson states: 
51. Supra note 33. 
52. It is not entirely clear that the decision in Johnson was correct under the law as 
it then stood. I.R.C. § 117 as enacted by Congress in 1954 placed no restriction on the 
amounts paid to degree candidates, whereas non-degree students were limited to stipends 
of $300 per month for 36 months. Congress expressed concern in the legislative history 
over stipends for nondegree students which were merely continuations of salary on leave, 
but none regarding degree candidates. Because Congress apparently intended to 
eliminate the compensation test for degree students in favor of a bright-line rule of 
exclusion, there was a strong argument that an employment relationship should be 
considered irrelevant if the scholarship is intended to further a degree student's studies, 
and that the Treasury Regulations were unreasonable to the extent they provided 
otherwise. The taxpayer in Johnson had family obligations and could not afford to take 
a one year leave without pay in order to pursue his research for a doctorate, and so the 
living stipend could very plausibly be regarded as a scholarship. The Third Circuit's 
pro-taxpayer opinion was far from unreasonable. See Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258 
(3d Cir. 1968); see also John Holt Myers, The Tax Status of Scholarships, 22 TAX LAW. 
391 (1969). On the other hand, testimony at trial established that the taxpayer's initial 
employment was partly motivated by the possibility of later pursuing an advanced degree 
at Westinghouse's expense, which points to a compensatory fringe-benefit analysis. See 
Transcript of Proceedings, Bingler v. Johnson in U.S. SUP. CT., RECORDS & BRIEFS 25-
26 (1968). 
53. Johnson, 394 U.S. at 757-58 (footnote omitted). 
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We accept the suggestion in the Goverrunent' s brief that the 
second paragraph of Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)-which excepts 
from the definition of "scholarship" any payments that are paid 
to an individual "to enable him to pursue studies or research 
primarily for the benefit of the grantor" -is merely an adjunct to 
the initial "compensation" provision: 
By this paragraph, the Treasury has supplemented the 
first in order to impose tax on bargained-for 
arrangements that do not create an employer-employee 
relation, as, for example, in the case of an independent 
contractor. But the general idea is the same: 
'scholarship' or 'fellowship' does not include 
arrangements where the recipient receives money and in 
return provides a quid pro quo. 54 
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In another much-quoted variation of its quid pro quo test, the Court used 
the phrase "no strings" to describe an excludible scholarship: "Here, the 
definitions supplied by the Regulation clearly are prima facie proper, 
comporting as they do with the ordinary understanding of 'scholarships' 
and 'fellowships' as relatively disinterested, 'no-strings' educational 
grants, with no requirement of any substantial quid pro quo from the 
recipients. "ss 
It should be noted that the Johnson decision concerned only the 
taxpayer's living stipend and ignored Westinghouse's reimbursements to 
the taxpayer for tuition and fees.s6 
54. Id. at 758 n.32 (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 22). 
55. Id. at 751. The Court's use of the word "disinterested" echoed the Court's test 
of "detached and disinterested generosity" for distinguishing gifts from compensation in 
its 1960 decision Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) (holding that the 
non-contractual gratuitous transfer of a Cadillac from one businessman to another as a 
token of appreciation for prior valuable services was not excludible as a gift under I.R.C. 
§ 102). This suggests that the 'quid' must be in the economic interest of the grantor. 
56. The IRS made no attempt to tax Westinghouse's reimbursement to the taxpayer 
of the cost of tuition, books and fees, and these amounts were not even mentioned in the 
decision. The government contended that "conceptually" the tuition and other 
reimbursements should also be treated as income, but pointed out that an offsetting 
deduction might be available to the taxpayer for business educational expenses under 
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5. See Petitioner's Brief at 10 n.7. 
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E. IRS Change of Position After Bingler v. Johnson 
Two years after Bingler v. Johnson, the IRS invoked the decision in 
GCM 34,49857 to rescind its longstanding position regarding public-
service LRAPs. The IRS' change of position occurs at the very end of the 
GCM, where it almost seems an afterthought, because the bulk of the 
GCM concerned a very different question. The principal purpose of GCM 
34,498 was to analyze a proposed revenue ruling, later published as 
Revenue Ruling 71-380,58 which concerned cash amounts received by 
project personnel who conducted advanced training sessions for grade-
school teachers under a program directed by a state educational agency, 
but which was largely funded by the federal Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (HEW). The GCM concluded that the payments 
were taxable despite the lack of any direct employment relationship 
between the project personnel and HEW. The principal authority cited 
was Johnson. 
GCM 34,498 seized upon footnote 32 of Johnson59 for the 
proposition that both the institution providing funds and the institution 
awarding or administering the grants are "grantors" within the meaning 
of the regulations. GCM 34,498 also cited the post-Johnson Tax Court 
decisions Turem v. Commissioner"° and Haley v. Commissioner. 61 The 
taxpayers in both cases were required to perform specific services for a 
specific employer who was one of the grantors, as in the proposed 
Revenue Ruling 71-380 under consideration. After disposing of this ruling 
with twelve pages of analysis, GCM 34,498 went on to revoke the NDEA 
and Mississippi plan GCMs62 in a single page with only the most cursory 
discussion, as if these public interest LRAPs involved the identical issue. 
57. May 17, 1971, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File. 
58. 1971-2 C.B. 101. 
59. Johnson, 394 U.S. at 758 n.32, quoted in text at supra note 54. 
60. 54 T.C. 1494, 1506-08 (1970) (holding that stipend paid by state welfare agency 
to enable employee of county welfare agency to take leave for advanced degree was 
taxable because recipient remained county employee while on leave and agreed to return 
to county employment; interrelationship of state and county sufficiently close to consider 
both to be "grantors"). 
61. 54 T.C. 642, 647 (1970) (holding that grant from Oregon State Welfare 
Commission to county welfare employee for educational leave to earn advanced degree 
in social work was taxable because taxpayer was obligated to accept county welfare 
position afterwards as condition for grant). 
62. Supra notes 41 & 47. GCM 34,498 also revoked GCM 33,375 which had 
recommended proposed pro-taxpayer revenue rulings based upon GCMs 30,700 and 
31,871. Thus none of the pro-taxpayer Mississippi plan and NDEA GCMs ever became 
a public ruling. 
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They clearly did not involve the same issue because the recipient of a 
public-service LRAP owes no service to any grantor. 63 The GCM did not 
mention the longstanding conditional-gift and public-benefit analyses it was 
reversing, and its entire analysis consisted of the following statement: 
In both GCM 30,700 and GCM 31,871, substantial services 
were required of the grantees as a condition of the grant. 
Although no employment relationship existed between grantor and 
grantee, these services were designed to accomplish the basic 
objectives of the grantors in both cases. Therefore, we now 
conclude that the grants in both cases are not scholarships or 
fellowships within the meaning of section 117 because they were 
made primarily for the benefit of the grantor. 64 
The IRS made its reversal of position public in Revenue Ruling 73-
256, 65 which considered precisely the same facts as the Mississippi plan 
medical LRAP at issue in GCM 30,700 and PLR 5807039700A, 66 and 
came to precisely the opposite conclusion. Revenue Ruling 73-256 gave 
as its authority the "no strings" language in Johnson, and while admitting 
that there was no employment relationship with the state, nevertheless 
concluded that the scholarship was "primarily for the benefit of the 
grantor" within the meaning of Treasury Regulations § l.117-4(c). The 
entire argument was contained in a single sentence: 
Thus, although no employment relationship exists between the 
grantor and the grantees, the services required do not further an 
educational purpose and are designed to accomplish a basic 
objective of the grantor. 67 
63. See infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
64. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,498, supra note 57. 
65. 1973-1 C.B. 56. 
66. July 3, 1958, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File. See supra notes 
41-43 and accompanying text. 
67. This statement seems erroneous because many students who could not otherwise 
afford to attend might be attracted to medical school by the LRAP, and thus the 
educational purpose is identical to that of any other need-based scholarship: removal of 
financial obstacles to education. Also, it is unquestionable that the ultimate aim of 
LRAPs is to attract qualified persons to public service work permanently rather than 
merely to obtain an agreed minimum term of service. Thus the educational purpose of 
the scholarship is to train a public interest physician. 
The IRS itself may have been a little unsure of the soundness of its ruling, because 
it later made Revenue Ruling 73-256 applicable prospectively only for loans made after 
June 11, 1973. See Rev. Rul. 74-540, 1974-2 C.B. 38. 
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F. Enactment of l.R.C. Section JOB(f) 
Congress soon repudiated Revenue Ruling 73-256, as had been 
predicted in GCM 30,700.68 In 1976, Congress enacted a provision 
exempting from tax any loan forgiveness pursuant to an LRAP requiring 
the student to work for a certain period of time in certain professions for 
any of a broad class of employers. The provision applied only if the loan 
was made by federal, state or local government directly or pursuant to an 
agreement with an educational institution. 69 The provision was 
temporary, but was extended in 197870 and made permanent in 1984 as 
I.R.C. § 108(f). 71 
Congress' reason for repudiating Revenue Ruling 73-256 was not to 
carve out an exception to the Treasury Regulations. Rather, the legislative 
history indicates in at least one place that Congress thought the IRS' 
interpretation of the Regulations was simply wrong. The Joint Committee 
report to the 1978 Act gives as its reason for rejecting the ruling: 
Many states and cities have experienced difficulty in attracting 
doctors, nurses, and teachers to serve certain areas, including 
68. May 27, 1958, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File. See discussion 
supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
69. The provision related to I.R.C. § 61, rather than§§ 108 or 117. Tax Reform 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2117, 90 Stat. 1520, 1911 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of26 U.S.C.). 
70. The provision was extended until January l, 1983 by § 162 of the Revenue Act 
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 162, 92 Stat. 2763, 2810 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U .S.C.). 
71. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1076, 98 Stat. 494, 1053 
(codified at I.R.C. § 108(t) (1994)). This seems misplaced because that implies the relief 
is an exception to I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) which treats discharge of indebtedness as gross 
income. The provision should more logically have been put under I.R.C. § 117, because 
the issue involves whether the loan forgiveness qualities as a scholarship. It cannot be 
income from discharge of indebtedness because the indebtedness is paid in full through 
compliance with the conditions of the loan agreement. 
The 1984 Act also made a few minor changes to the 1976 provision. These 
included tightening the restriction against compensation by requiring the qualifying 
employers to be from a broad class, thus precluding conditionment of loan forgiveness 
on performance of services for a single employer or a small group of employers. Also, 
the class of qualifying lenders was expanded to include public benefit hospital 
corporations which are treated as governmental entities under applicable state law, since 
these organizations perform a function which is essentially similar to governmentally-
operated hospitals. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., 
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REvENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT 
OF 1984, at 1200 (Joint Comm. Print 1984). 
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both rural communities and low-income urban areas. A provision 
in student loan programs for loan cancellation in certain 
circumstances is intended to encourage the recipients, upon 
graduation, to perform needed services in such areas. In these 
circumstances, the loan cancellation is not primarily for the 
benefit of the grantor (as the Service ruled in 1973), but for the 
benefit of the entire community. The exclusion from income of the 
amount of indebtedness discharged in exchange for these serv~ces 
promotes the purpose of the programs.72 
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The IRS ignored the Joint Committee's criticism, however, and in 
cases which did not conform precisely to the letter of LR.C. § 108(f), it 
continued to adhere to its position in Revenue Ruling 73-256. For 
example, in Revenue Ruling 77-319,73 the IRS cited the quid pro quo 
language of Johnson and its own Revenue Ruling 73-256 to hold that 
National Research Service (NRS) awards for medical research were 
taxable because they were conditioned upon the recipient's engaging 
afterwards in an equivalent number of years of teaching or research, or in 
medical practice in designated underserved areas. The NRS awards were 
not covered by the 1976 legislative relief (which was not mentioned in the 
ruling) because they are made in the form of outright grants which must 
be repaid if the conditions are not met, rather than as cancelable loans. 74 
In addition to the forbidden services, the IRS objected to another NRS 
condition: the government had reserved the right to make royalty-free use 
of any copyrighted materials produced during the award period. The IRS 
construed this as an additional quid pro quo, although it seems trivial75 
and had little or nothing to do with the principal purpose of the awards, 
72. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 95TH CONG., lST SESS., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1978, at 120-21 (Joint Comm. Print 1979) 
(emphasis added). Very similar language appears in the 1976 explanation. The only 
substantial difference is that instead of the first clause of the above-quoted italicized 
sentence\ the following clause appears instead: "Proponents of these programs believe 
that .... " STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 630 {Joint Comm. Print 1976). 
73. 1977-2 C.B. 48. 
74. In principle, the quid pro quo test is the same for a cancelable note as for a 
conditional grant if both are tested as scholarships. Note that the range of possibilities 
for fulfillment of the NRS postgraduate obligation is far wider than under the Mississippi 
plan. 
75. See Stuart, supra note 34, at 380, 384-85. Stuart correctly pointed out that the 
Johnson quid pro quo test resulted in "simplistic and mechanical" decisions turning on 
minor matters such as publication rights to reach "illogical and unjust" results. These 
decisions contradict the government's own Treasury Regulation§ 1.117(4)(c)(2) which 
states that an "incidental benefit" to the grantor will not preclude scholarship status. 
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which was to assure the continued excellence of biomedical and behavioral 
research in the United States.76 
In 1978, Congress stepped in and legislatively overruled Revenue 
Ruling 77-319 retroactively for awards made during years 1974 through 
1979.77 In 1983, the IRS relented and reversed Revenue Ruling 77-319 
in Revenue Ruling 83-9378 on the ground that changes made by the 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 198179 rendered the ruling obsolete. 
These changes consisted of dropping the service requirement as an 
alternative, so that the only post-grant requirement for an NRS award 
became health research or teaching, which was held to. be in accordance 
76. The IRS has displayed extreme aggressiveness in another aspect of medical 
scholarship programs. In Hawronskyv. Commissioner, 105 T.C. No. 8 (1995), the Tax 
Court denied the taxpayer physician a deduction for a statutorily compelled payment to 
the government of triple damages for breach of his contract to complete his service of 
years in the National Health Service Corps, on the theory that the damages constitute a 
non-deductible "penalty" under l.R.C. § 162(t). The decision seems erroneous because 
the treble damages are clearly labeled damages for breach of contract under 42 U.S.C. 
254o(b) (1994), and Treasury Regulation § 1.162-2l(b)(2) plainly states that 
"compensatory damages ..• paid to a government do not constitute a fine or penalty." 
Moreover, l.R.C. § 162(t) disallows only penalties "for the violation of any law," and 
the taxpayer violates no law by breaching the contract. Ironically, several federal courts 
had already rejected physicians' attempts to avoid payment of the treble damages on the 
ground that they are a penalty and hence unenforceable, holding that the treble damages 
clause represents "liquidated damages" rather than a "penalty." 
Before NHSC scholarships became taxable in 1986 as a result of the repeal of 
former I.R.C. § 117(c), the IRS had ruled that the treble damages were non-deductible 
under a different and equally erroneous theory in PLR 8506050 (Nov. 13, 1984) and 
again in GCM 39,336 (Oct. 12, 1984). The IRS admitted that the payment of damages 
was a Joss incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business, but denied the deduction by 
invoking l.R.C. § 265(a) on the dubious ground that the damages were "directly 
allocable" to the earlier receipt of the tax-free scholarship funds. 
l.R.C. § 265(a) was enacted principally to prevent tax profits from arbitraging the 
payment of deductible interest in order to eam tax-free municipal bond interest. In any 
case l.R.C. § 265(a) applies only to expenses, not to losses, and the damages resemble 
a Joss from abandonment of a business far more than a current expense. A deduction for 
Joss of the principal of a municipal bond is unquestionably allowable despite the fact that 
it is "directly allocable" to exempt income in precisely the same sense. Neither PLR 
8506050 nor GCM 39,336 cited any authority or reasoning for its conclusion other than 
the words of the statute itself. 
77. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 161(b), 92 Stat. 2763, 2810 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
78. 1983-1 C.B. 364. 
79. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357. 
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with the usual patterns of academic employment and therefore not a 
forbidden quid pro quo. 80 
G. Amended l.R.C. Section 117 and Proposed Regulations 
Current I.R.C. § 117(c) as amended in 1986 denies the scholarship 
exclusion for any amount "which represents payment for teaching, 
research, or other services by the student required as a condition for 
receiving the qualified scholarship. "81 As explained above, 82 the pre-
1987 version applied only to "services in the nature of part-time 
employment" and even then it excepted any services which were required 
of all degree candidates. 83 Congress seems to have intended the prior 
provision to apply solely to services performed by students for the 
educational institution or its affiliates, although at least one reported 
decision might imply a broader interpretation. In Ferris v. 
Commissioner, 84 the Tax Court held that hourly wages paid by Columbia 
University to an undergraduate for part-time employment at a Better 
Business Bureau as part of a work-study program were taxable 
compensation for services under then I.R.C. § 117(b)(l). The decision 
seems correct although it does not address the fact that Columbia 
80. Rev. Rul. 83-93 did not specify what these changes were. A 1981 IRS internal 
memorandum explains: 
the only requirement is that a recipient subject to the payback satisfy a 
commitment to engage in health research or teaching or any combination 
thereof which is in accordance with the usual patterns of academic employment 
for the specified period. No longer is service in the National Health Corps, 
service in a health maintenance organization in a medically underserved area, 
or any other service a possible alternative. 
I.R.S. Memorandum (emphasis added) (excerpted from incomplete I.R.S. Memorandum 
kept on file with author). 
The government's reserved right to any royalties was unchanged by the legislation, 
however, and remains in 45 C.F.R. § 74.36 (1995). The I.R.S. Memorandum explained 
that "[a]s a practical matter, however, there is no record that any copyright material has 
ever been reported by a grantee. Moreover, the officials of the Public Health Service 
are not aware of any instance where the Public Health Service has exercised the right to 
royalty free use of copyrighted material." I.R.S. Memorandum, supra. 
81. I.R.C. § 117(c) (1994). 
82. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
83. I.R.C. § 117(b)(l) (1954). For legislative history, see supra note 32. 
84. 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 774 (1989). 
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apparently had no affiliation with the Bureau and derived no benefit from 
the student's services. 85 
Current l.R.C. § 117(c) has potentially a far wider reach, and can be 
interpreted as applying to post-graduation services such as those in Bingler 
v. Johnson. 86 On the other hand, nothing in the legislative history of § 
85. The taxpayer represented himself and did not raise the argument. If it had been 
raised, however, the result would probably have been the same. Although the facts were 
not developed in the decision, it appears that the work-study program was largely funded 
by the federal government pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2754 (1988). Section 2751 
states: 
The purpose is to stimulate and promote the part-time employment of students 
. . • who are in need of earnings from employment to pursue courses of study 
at eligible institutions, and to encourage students receiving Federal student 
financial assistance to participate in community service activities that will 
benefit the Nation and engender in the students a sense of social responsibility 
and commitment to the community. 
Id. § 2751. The school administers work-study grants under an agreement with the 
government to place students in public interest part-time employment. Columbia's 
program is still in existence substantially as it was in 1985, the tax year in question in 
Ferris, and the Better Business Bureau is still one of the many approved participating 
employers. Columbia pays the student by the hour according to time sheets provided by 
the Bureau, withholds upon the wages and sends a Form W-2. The government 
reimburses Columbia for 70% of the expense, and the Bureau reimburses Columbia the 
other 30%. Telephone Interview with Maribel Longi, Assistant Director, Columbia 
Work-Study Program (Mar. 17, 1995). 
The 30% paid by the Bureau is necessarily wages. The government's 70% is 
probably also wages, because Congress intended the program to provide "earnings from 
part-time employment" rather than a scholarship, and also because the student is paid by 
the hour. Note that this situation is easily distinguishable from LRAPs where the 
participant is fully compensated by the employer. Also, LRAP benefits are not 
determined by hours worked, but rather by the amount of student indebtedness and 
financial need. 
86. 394 U.S. 741 (1969). Evidence for this interpretation may be found in the 
House Report. See H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., v. II, at 16 (1986). The 
1986 Act also repealed former I.R.C. § 117(c) which excluded from taxable income 
grants under federal programs which were conditioned upon future employment for the 
federal government. The House Report explained that such future services will no longer 
be entitled to more favorable tax treatment than services for another employer, and the 
"general rule" will apply. Id. The "general rule" referred to appears to be that of 
current I.R.C. § 117(c) quoted in the text above. This is also the view of Bittker & 
Lokken, who state: 
The elimination of the reference to part-time work allows this language to be 
the fulcrum of the scholarship versus compensation dichotomy. For years after 
1986, the Bingler v. Johnson test should be reformulated as three questions: 
(1) Did the student render services? (2) If so, were the services a condition for 
receiving the award? (3) If so, was the award payment for the services? If all 
three questions are answered affirmatively, the award is taxable compensation. 
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117(c) indicates that Congress intended any substantive change in the 
Bingler v. Johnson test, and as applied to post-graduation services, I.R.C. 
§ 117(c) can be regarded as merely codifying the quid pro quo test as it 
then existed under Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4( c) and 
Johnson.'1>1 The "payment for services" language of I.R.C. § 117(c) 
is highly ambiguous on the critical question regarding LRAPs: services for 
whose benefit? Proposed Regulation§ l.117-6(d)(2), which interprets the 
new statutory "payment for services" language, is as ambiguous as the 
statute. It provides no guidance for the LRAP situation in which the 
required services are performed for third parties, and provide no benefit 
to the grantor. 88 The Proposed Regulation is more elaborate than 
Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4( c), but it is in substance the same, 89 
except that the "primarily for the benefit of the grantor" test was explicitly 
abandoned as an independent criterion and rolled into the "services" or 
quid pro quo test. 90 The Proposed Regulation provides six examples to 
illustrate the payment-for-services test, but all six involve recipients who 
perform services directly for the grantor. 91 Thus, neither the amended 
statute nor the Proposed Regulation sheds any light upon the LRAP 
problem, and the applicable principles of law remain as they were before 
1986. 
The compensation stigma is avoided, in contrast, if any of the three is 
answered no. 
BIITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 30, , 11.2.2. 
87. This appears to be the view of Bittker & Lokken as well, because their 
explanation quoted supra note 86 simply restates the Johnson test. In addition, all three 
of the 1994 I.R.S. Information Letters discussed infra notes 102-103, 107 and 
accompanying text expressly state that the quid pro quo test remains unchanged. 
Id. 
88. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(d){2), 53 Fed. Reg. 111 (1988). 
89. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(d)(2) states: 
Payment for services. For purposes of this section, a scholarship or 
fellowship grant represents payment for services when the grantor requires the 
recipient to perform services in return for the granting of the scholarship or 
fellowship. A requirement that the recipient pursue studies, research, or other 
activities primarily for the benefit of the grantor is treated as a requirement to 
perform services. . . . A scholarship or fellowship grant conditioned upon 
either past, present, or future teaching, research, or other services by the 
recipient represents payment for services under this section. 
90. This change merely recognizes the development in the case law after Bingler v. 
Johnson. See discussion infra part III.B. 
91. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(d){5), 53 Fed. Reg. 111 (1988). 
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H. Porten v. Commissioner 
The sole reported court decision concerning an LRAP is Porten v. 
Commissioner. 92 The decision does not concern legal education, but it 
would certainly be cited as authority in any future litigation over a legal 
LRAP. The LRAP program in Porten was instituted by the State of 
Alaska in 1972 in order to stem a "brain drain" from the state. 93 The 
state advanced loans to Alaska residents for college tuition and fees which 
were partially forgiven for each year the graduate remained an Alaska 
resident and was engaged in any form of employment without 
limitation. 94 For seventeen years the IRS made no attempt to tax 
beneficiaries of the Alaska LRAP, and everyone assumed it was tax-
free. 95 In 1989, however, the IRS notified the Alaska Commission on 
Postsecondary Education that it had determined the plan was taxable and 
would make assessments retroactive one year to 1988.96 The IRS' 
decision prompted an immediate reaction in Alaska. In a 1990 joint 
resolution, the Alaska state legislature declared that its intent was to 
provide tax-free scholarship grants,97 and the Alaska delegation to 
Congress proposed legislation to overturn the IRS decision 
retroactively.98 The Porten court took note of all this, but decided 
against the taxpayer nonetheless. After holding that the Alaska 
legislature's characterization of the LRAP as a "scholarship" was not 
controlling for federal tax purposes, the court went on to hold (1) that the 
LRAP did not fall within the exclusion ofI.R.C. § 108(t) because the loan 
forgiveness was not conditioned upon employment in any particular 
profession; (2) that the postgraduate requirement of Alaska residency was 
92. 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1994 (1993). 
93. Id. at 1996. Although limited to Alaska residents, the LRAP was not restricted 
to education within Alaska where opportunities were limited. The LRAP was designed 
to fund the education of Alaskans at out-of-state institutions (provided they return to 
Alaska after graduation) as well as to subsidize in-state education. See Letter from Rep. 
Don Young (AL) to Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury (Oct. 12, 1989) (on 
file with the New York Law School Law Review). 
94. The grantee need not actually live or work in Alaska to maintain sufficient 
contact to remain a legal resident. See Porten, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1996. 
95. See Letter from Rep. Don Young to Nicholas F. Brady, supra note 93. 
96. See Letter from John Havelock, Chairman, Alaska Commission on 
Postsecondary Education to LRAP recipients (May 30, 1990) (on file with the New York 
Law School Law Review). 
97. Porten, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1995 (citing Alaska Leg. Res. No. 95 (1990)). 
98. S. 1803, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (introduced by Sen. Ted Stevens); H.R. 
3518, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (introduced by Rep. Don Young). Both proposed 
bills died aborning. 
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a significant quid pro quo within the meaning of Bingler v. Johnson; and 
(3) that the loan forgiveness was not a gift on the ground that the 
residency requirement indicated a lack of "detached and disinterested 
generosity. "99 The Porten decision is criticized infra part III. 
I. Private Letter Ruling 9526020 
In PLR 9526020, 100 widely believed to have been requested by 
NYU, the IRS ruled that an outright grant of law school tuition is a tax-
free scholarship even if the recipient is contractually obligated to work in 
public interest law for ten years following graduation and is further 
obligated to pay a penalty for breach of the condition. The IRS reasoned 
as follows: 
The service commitment imposed upon participants . . . does not 
constitute the requirement of a substantial quid pro quo from the 
recipients; on the contrary, the grants are relatively disinterested 
grants of the University, designed to accomplish public rather 
than private or proprietary purposes. Recipients are free to take 
nearly any position of their choosing, anywhere, subject only to 
the compensation limitations prescribed. The service commitment 
is essentially a de minimis limitation designed to assure that X's 
graduates practice in all income sectors of the legal profession, 
including public, lower-paying, and otherwise underserved areas 
or capacities, a public purpose for which the M scholarship 
program has been established by X. Any benefit inuring to the 
University-grantor appears remote, insubstantial and 
inconsequential for purposes of section 117(c). 101 
The holding of PLR 9526020 is not surprising in light of other recent 
IRS Information Letters from the same office concerning conditional 
grants for medical education which indicate that the IRS has significantly 
relaxed its position on the public-service issue. The IRS advised that two 
programs implemented by the Department of Health and Human Resources 
(HHR) are tax-free scholarships: the Exceptional Financial Need (EFN) 
scholarship, 102 and the Financial Assistance for Disadvantaged Health 
99. Porten, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1994-96 (citing Commissionerv. Duberstein, 363 
U.S. 278, 285 (1960)). 
100. Apr. 3, 1995. 
101. Id. 
102. 42 u.s.c. § 293 (1994). 
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Professions Students (FADHPS) scholarship, 103 on the ground that the 
post-graduation service requirement of a five-year term of primary care 
practice is "in accordance with usual patterns of employment. "104 Also, 
the IRS recently confirmed that NRS awards continue to be tax-free 
scholarships under Revenue Ruling 83-93, 105 because the post-award 
requirement of research or teaching for a term of years is similarly within 
the usual patterns of employment. 106 Like the law school grant in PLR 
9526020, all three programs involve outright grants with repayment 
penalties rather than loans. However, all three arguably have narrower 
ranges of choice for fulfillment of the service requirement than does the 
law school grant. The EFN and FADHPS grants restrict the graduate to 
practice in the field of primary medical care for which the specialized 
training is provided, though without geographical limitation, and the NRS 
grant requires teaching or research, which seems more restricted than 
would be a requirement of medically-related work of any kind but with an 
income ceiling. 
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The outer limits of the IRS' ruling position appeared in a third letter 
relating to the National Health Service Corps (NHSC) scholarship 
program, 107 which is again a grant with a contractual service 
103. 42 U.S.C. § 293(a) (1994). Under both programs, HHR provides grants to 
schools of medicine, dentistry and other health professions for disbursement to needy 
students to cover tuition, fees, books and other educational expenses. In the case of 
students of medicine and osteopathy, the student must (1) complete the education for 
which assistance is provided, (2) enter and complete a residency training program in a 
primary health care specialty within four years of such completion, and (3) practice in 
the specialty for five years following completion of the residency training. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 295n(a) (1994). Failure to meet these conditions requires repayment of the award plus 
interest. Id. § 295n(b). · 
104. The IRS explained its decision as follows: "The obligated service commitment 
imposed upon participants in these two programs •.. does not constitute the requirement 
of a substantial quid pro quo from the recipients, in that recipients must engage only in 
activities which are in accordance with usual patterns of academic or professional 
employment." Information Letter from Branch 6, Assistant Chief Counsel, Income Tax 
& Accounting, Internal Revenue Service 3 (Sept. 26, 1994) (on file with the New York 
Law School Law Review). 
105. 1983-1 C.B. 364. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. 
106. See Memorandum from Branch 6, Assistant Chief Counsel, Income Tax & 
Accounting, Internal Revenue Service 3 (Oct. 11, 1994) (on file with the New York Law 
School Law Review). 
107. Information Letter from Branch 6, Assistant Chief Counsel, Income Tax & 
Accounting, Internal Revenue Service (Oct. 11, 1994) (on file with the New York Law 
School Law Review). Participants in the NHSC program receive grants for both tuition 
and living expenses in medical school, and are required to practice primary medical care 
following their training in one of a number of designated medically underserved areas. 
1996] LRAP'S FOR PUBUC-INTEREST LAWYERS 277 
requirement. The NHSC service requirement is to practice in a designated 
underserved area of the graduate's choice. The IRS regards this 
requirement as a substantial quid pro quo which negates scholarship status, 
despite the fact that participants generally do not work for the federal 
government, but rather for locally-operated community or migrant health 
centers108 or even in private practice. 109 The IRS' position is 
apparently based on the fact that the NHSC has, in principle at least, the 
right to direct a given graduate to a given location of service, no 
although it rarely exercises this right. m It is unclear whether the 
off ending factor is this right of control alone, or the fact that exercise of 
such control may result in employment by the federal government. 112 
There are apparently no recent rulings concerning cancelable loans as 
opposed to grants with conditions. PLR 9526020 states that the law 
school grants are not loans even if the penalty feature might have the 
effect of repayment, but it does not go on to explain the significance of 
this finding, or whether the result would be different if the ruling request 
had involved cancelable loans (or cash assistance for loan repayment) with 
A substantial penalty (triple the amount of the award plus interest) is imposed for failure 
to complete the service requirement. See id. at 2. 
108. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEAL TH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 
CORPS SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995/ACADEMIC YEAR 1995-96, at 
10 (Dec. 1994) (stating that most participants serve as employees of such centers and are 
paid directly by the local health clinic). Participants may be federal employees if they 
choose placements with the Indian Health Service or the Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 11. 
109. Id. 
110. See l.R.S. Information Letter, supra note 107. 
111. See generally id. (stating that the placement opportunity list for the NHSC wiII 
contain three times the number of vacancies as recipients available for service, or 500 
vacancies, whichever is less. However, the NHSC wiII determine the number of 
available vacancies in a year if there are 500 or more recipients available for service. 
Thus, the NHSC rarely directs a participant to a particular location and then only because 
the participant has failed to select any one of the many hundreds of approved positions. 
On the other hand, if the participant is directed to a location, it may be as a federal 
employee.). 
112. It is not clear that the IRS' position is justified in either case, except as applied 
to an individual who actually does work for the federal government. 
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the same service conditions. 113 Somewhat oddly, no one has ever 
requested such a ruling. 
If such a ruling were requested, the result should in principle be the 
same as in PLR 9526020: a tax-free scholarship, because the public 
service requirement does not run afoul of the quid pro quo test, and that 
test was the only reason the IRS gave for its reversal of position in 1972 
when it decided that the NDEA and Mississippi plan LRAPs were 
taxable. 114 
On the other hand, the enactment of I.R.C. § 108(f) in the interim 
may appear to have split off delayed financial aid in the form of LRAPs 
as a separate category to which the general scholarship tests under I.R.C. 
§ 117 are no longer applicable. The Porten decision appears to be some 
authority for this view. 
III. ANALYSIS: ARE LRAPs EXCLUDIBLE? 
This Part will examine critically the authorities under which LRAPs 
might be excludible. Parts A through E consider whether LRAPs may 
qualify as scholarships and conclude that they do, and Parts F and G 
examine whether an LRAP may be a price adjustment or a gift. Part H 
considers a potential counterargument based upon horizontal equity, and 
Part I explores the effects that clarifying the law might have upon 
compliance. 
A. Does I.R.C. Section 108(/) Preempt the LRAP Area? 
If Congress intended I.R.C. § 108(f) to preempt the area, as the 
Porten court stated, LRAPs for legal education would be taxable under 
current law. Thus it is necessary to consider in some depth the intended 
scope of I.R.C. § 108(f) and whether the Porten decision is correct. 115 
113. NYU has three different public-service financial aid programs all running 
simultaneously: a grant-with-contractual-service-commitment such as that described in 
PLR 9526020; a grant-with-moral-commitment which is a fortiori a tax-free scholarship; 
and the Melvyn and Barbara Weiss LRAP which pays installments of cash. Recipients 
of both types of grants, which are limited to 2/3 of tuition, are also eligible for the 
LRAP assistance. The stated purpose of running all three programs is to make an 
"experiment" to determine over the next 10 years which type is most effective in 
encouraging public service law. See Public Service at NYU, NYU: THE LAW SCHOOL 
MAGAZINE, Spring 1995, at 60. 
114. See discussion supra part II.E. 
115. The taxpayer had only $268 at stake in the litigation and was not represented 
by counsel. The decision was not appealed. Porten v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1994 (1993). 
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The Alaska LRAP in Porten clearly does not fall within the protection 
afforded by the literal language of I.R.C. § 108(f). The Porten court 
might have denied the taxpayer's claim for protection under I.R.C. § 
108(f) upon that fact alone, but it did not. By its terms, I.R.C. § 108(f) 
applies only to loan discharges conditioned upon working "for a certain 
period of time in certain professions for any of a broad class of 
employers. "116 The court stated that this language carries the "clear 
implication" that "forgiveness of student loans, other than those identified 
in the statute, gives rise to income from discharge of indebtedness." 117 
The court cited no authority supporting this conclusion, however, and 
provided no reasoning to defend it. l.R.C. § 108(t) itself does not state 
that it is the exclusive route to tax relief, 118 nor is there any such 
indication in the legislative history. If anything the reverse implication is 
more persuasive for at least two reasons: (1) the language of I.R.C. § 
108(f) implies that the provision is not exclusive, and (2) the legislative 
history indicates that Congress simply intended to correct the IRS' 
erroneous interpretation of existing law in Revenue Ruling 73-256 and did 
not intend to create new law, preemptive or otherwise. 119 
Current I.R.C. § 108(f)(l), enacted in 1984, reads as follows: 
(f) Student loans. 
(1) In general. In the case of an individual, gross income does not 
include any amount which (but for this subsection) would be 
includible in gross income by reason of the discharge (in whole 
Porten was decided by a Special Trial Judge rather than a Judge of the Tax Court 
and was reported as a "memorandum" decision. Memorandum decisions of the Tax 
Court are not officially published, and ordinarily involve the application of settled legal 
principles to the facts rather than novel questions of law. See 4 Barus I. BITIKER & 
LAWRENCE LoKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES AND GIFTS 1 115.2.1. 
(1992). As explained here and infra notes 139-149 and accompanying text, however, at 
least two important legal questions of first impression were involved in Porten: (1) 
whether I.R.C. § 108(f) is preemptive; and (2) if not, whether post-graduate conditions 
providing no direct economic benefit to any grantor negate scholarship status. The court 
failed to recognize that these were novel issues and simply embraced the IRS' positions 
as if they were dictated by settled law and beyond discussion. 
116. I.R.C. § 108(f)(l) (1994). 
117. Porten, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1996. 
118. Congress might easily have provided that I.R.C. § 108(f) was preemptive had 
it desired this result. Cf. the neighboring provision I.R.C. § 108(e)(l) which states, 
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, there shall be no insolvency exception 
from the general rule that gross income includes income from the discharge of 
indebtedness." I.R.C. § 108(e)(l) (1994). 
119. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
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or in part) of any student loan if such discharge was pursuant to 
a provision of such loan under which all or part of the 
indebtedness of the individual would be discharged if the 
individual worked for a certain period of time in certain 
professions for any of a broad class of employers. 120 
It is this italicized clause which seems to imply that Congress thought 
some LRAPs may be excludible even without the express protection of 
l.R.C. § 108(f). The clause was absent from both the 1976 and 1978 
temporary versions of the provision. 121 Read literally, the clause appears 
to be surplusage. If a loan discharge would have been excludible in any 
case, the provision does not apply, but it need not apply because the 
discharge is already excluded. Thus the italicized language seems 
purposeless. 122 
However, as the Porten court itself pointed out, it is an "'elementary 
rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, 
120. l.R.C. § 108(t)(l) (1994) (emphasis added). 
121. It is interesting to note that the Porten LRAP would have qualified under the 
earlier versions which specified disjunctively either a geographic condition or a class-of-
employer restriction, but not both. The reason for the change is not apparent. The 1976 
version reads as follows: 
In the case of an individual, no amount shall be included in gross income 
for purposes of section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 by reason of 
the discharge of all or part of the indebtedness of the individual under a 
student loan if such discharge was pursuant to a provision of such loan under 
which all or part of the indebtedness of the individual would be discharged if 
the individual worked for a certain period of time in certain geographical areas 
or for certain classes of employers. 
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2117, 90 Stat. 1520, 1911. In 1978, 
Congress changed the effective date of I.R.C. § 2117 to discharges of indebtedness made 
before January 1, 1983. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 162, 92 Stat. 
2763, 2810 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
122. One might argue to the contrary that if the loan discharge were excludible 
outside I.R.C. § 108(t) by reason of the insolvency exception under I.R.C. § 
108(a)(l)(B), attribute reduction would be required under I.R.C. § 108(b), and that the 
effect of the italicized language is thus to subordinate loan forgiveness under I.R.C. § 
108(t) to the insolvency exception. 
This interpretation, however, seems far-fetched. Congress showed no concern for 
this issue in the legislative history of I.R.C. § 108(f), and with good reason, because 
student loans are nondischargeable under§ 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, except in 
cases of undue hardship. See THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS 
AND CREDITORS 115.07(3)(h) (rev. ed. 1991 & Supp. 1994). Also, it seems very 
unlikely that a recipient of student loan forgiveness would ever have such tax attributes 
as net operating losses or basis in non-exempt assets, especially in cases of discharge for 
undue hardship. 
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clause and sentence of a statute.' A statute should be construed so that 
effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous, void or insignificant." 123 
It is always possible that the italicized clause is merely the product of 
poor drafting. On the other hand, the language can be read as an attempt 
to indicate that some student loan forgiveness may be excludible even if 
it is outside the express conditions of I.R.C. § 108(f). Because the 
provision explicitly applies only to forgiveness which is not otherwise 
excludible, this implies the drafter contemplated that some student loan 
forgiveness is (or at least may be) otherwise excludible. In short, the 
language can be interpreted as an intentional statement that l.R.C. § 108(f) 
is not preemptive of the area of LRAPs. 
Some support for this interpretation can be found by analogy with the 
neighboring provision l.R.C. § 108(e)(5) which contains nearly identical 
language: 
(5) Purchase-money debt reduction for solvent debtor treated 
as price reduction. -If-
(A) the debt of a purchaser of property to the seller of such 
property which arose out of the purchase of such property is 
reduced, 
(B) such reduction does not occur-
(i) in a title 11 case, or 
(ii) when the purchaser is insolvent, and 
(C) but for this paragraph, such reduction would be treated 
as income to the purchaser from the discharge of indebtedness, /1 
then such reduction shall be treated as a purchase price 
adjustment. 124 
123. Porten, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1997 (citing 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION, § 46.06 (1986) (citations omitted)). The Porten court did not discuss 
the italicized language of § 108(t)(l) at all, but instead was referring to the phrase "in 
certain professions" and arguing that it should not be read out of the statute. Id. 
Perhaps not, but the absence of any restrictions at all as to the nature of employment 
should logically help rather than hurt the taxpayer's case, because the greater his 
freedom, the less resemblance there is to compensation for services. See also supra note 
121 for qualification under statutory precursor to l.R.C. § 108(t). 
124. l.R.C. § 108(e)(5) (1994) (emphasis added). 
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The meaning of this italicized clause is no more obvious than that of 
I.R.C. § 108(f)(l). However, it is clear that I.R.C. § 108(e)(5) is not 
preemptive, but rather a kind of safe harbor. Current I.R.C. § 108(e)(5), 
enacted in 1980, 125 provides that a reduction of a purchaser's debt to a 
seller of property is treated as a purchase price adjustment if the debt is 
still held by the seller and the reduction would otherwise be treated as 
income from cancellation of indebtedness (COD). Case law had 
recognized such an exception to the rule of COD income since 1940. 126 
However, disputes as to its scope led Congress to codify the 
exception. 127 The provision is clearly not preemptive of the field of 
price adjustments, 128 and the IRS recently confirmed this by explicitly 
ruling that the price adjustment rule survives outside the I.R.C. § 
108(e)(5) safe harbor. 129 
If the inartful "but-for-this-provision-would-be-income" language of 
I.R.C. § 108(e)(5) means simply that the subsection is not intended to 
preclude tax-free treatment for transactions outside its terms, as appears 
to be the case, the nearly identical language in neighboring I.R.C. § 108(f) 
125. Enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 
3389, 3393 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 26 
U.S.C.). 
126. See, e.g., Hirsch v. CIR, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940) (holding that where 
taxpayer purchased property for cash and assumption of existing mortgage, and eight 
years later mortgagee reduced debt in recognition of property's decline in value, debt 
reduction was nontaxable price adjustment, not COD income). The courts placed 
limitations on the doctrine of price reduction, however, for example, it did not apply if 
the debt-financed property still had sufficient value to satisfy the entire debt. See, e.g., 
Coddon & Bros Inc. v. CIR, 37 B.T.A. 393 (1938); CIR v. Coastwise Transport Co., 
71 F.2d 104 (1st Cir. 1934). Debt reduction has also been taxed if it did not result from 
direct negotiations with the vendor-mortgagee, or if such negotiations concerned the debt 
rather than the property. See Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth St. Corp. v. CIR, 147 F.2d 453 
(2d Cir. 1944). 
127. Sees. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2dSess. 16-17 (1980), reprinted in 1980-2 
C.B. at 628. 
128. By its terms l.R.C. § 108(e)(5) applies only if debt reduction would otherwise 
have been treated as COD income under prior case law. It was certainly not intended 
to overrule Hirsch, and similar cases. I.R.C. § 108(e}(5) does not apply to Hirsch as a 
technical matter, because such cases do not trigger COD income under longstanding case 
law. See cases cited supra note 126. 
129. See Rev. Rut. 92-99, 1992-2 C.B. 35 (debt reduction by holder of note who 
is not the seller may qualify if the reduction clearly relates to the property rather than 
the debt); see also Richard M. Lipton, New Rulings on Purchase Price Reductions Do 
Not Provide Much Relief, 78 J. TAX'N 68 (1993). 
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enacted only four years later can plausibly be interpreted in the same 
way. 130 This interpretation at least gives meaning to statutory language 
that would otherwise be mere surplusage. 
This interpretation is also consistent with the history of l.R.C. § 
108(t). As noted above, 131 Congress enacted the predecessor relief in 
1976 and 1978 to reverse Revenue Ruling 73-256 on the ground that the 
IRS had incorrectly interpreted its own regulations by failing to recognize 
that the primary beneficiary of the Mississippi plan (and of NDEA loans 
for teachers) was not the grantor, but rather the general public. Thus it 
seems fair to say that Congress did not intend to change the law by 
enacting l.R.C. § 108(t), but rather to clarify it by purging the IRS' 
erroneous interpretation in Revenue Ruling 73-256. 132 If this 
interpretation is correct, it follows that to the extent the law governing 
scholarships reasonably permits, LRAPs other than those within the I.R.C. 
§ 108(t) safe harbor should also be excludible. 
Because of their close resemblance to safe-harbor LRAPs, law school 
LRAPs appear to be likely candidates for just such "nonqualifying" but 
nonetheless excludible status as scholarships. The public-benefit rationale 
of l.R.C. § 108(t) and of the IRS' pre-Bingler v. Johnson pro-taxpayer 
position133 seems to apply just as well to legal LRAPs as to the NDEA 
and Mississippi plans. Public need for legal services seems hardly less 
urgent than for medicine, nursing, and teaching, and is generally agreed 
to be in extremely short supply for the needy. 134 
130. Plausibly, but not certainly. An argument based upon symmetrical language 
alone is always dangerous. See Richard A. Westin, Dubious Interpretative Rules for 
Construing Federal Taxing Statutes, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1981) ("The tax 
laws are such a hodgepodge of exceptions, qualifications, special interests and sometimes 
logically inconsistent treatment that they cannot be treated as symmetrical exigeses. 
[sic]") (quoting Burck v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 768, 772 n.7 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
131. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
132. According to the Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, the "certain 
professions" intended are medicine, nursing, and teaching. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAX'N, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION 
ACT OF 1984, at 1199 (Joint Comm. Print 1984). As enacted, however, I.R.C. § 108(f) 
does not specify the "certain professions." This deliberate vagueness seems another 
indication that Congress disapproved of the IRS' interpretation of the public-service 
LRAP problem in general, and did not wish to limit its rejection to the specific result of 
Revenue Ruling 73-256 as applied to a single profession or even a specified list of 
favored professions. 
133. See discussion supra part Il.C. 
134. See Zubrow, supra note 18, at 513-14; see also William J. Dean, The Legal 
Services Corp., N.Y. L.J., Sept. 2, 1994, at 3 (stating that nationally, it has been 
estimated by the Legal Services Corporation that only about one-fifth of the needs of the 
poor are being met); William J. Dean, Surveys of Activity in New York, N.Y. L.J., July 
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Parts III.B through E analyze the general question whether I.R.C. § 
117 permits exclusion of legal LRAPs as scholarships independently of 
I.R.C. § 108(t). 
B. The Primary Bene.fit Test 
Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4( c) denies scholarship status to any 
grant which is "primarily for the benefit of the grantor." The regulations 
provide no examples for guidance as to its meaning, however. The IRS 
and the courts have often invoked the primary-benefit language in order 
to deny scholarship status, including Revenue Ruling 73-256 which ruled 
against the Mississippi plan. 135 The primary-benefit test has always been 
applied in conjunction with the compensation or "quid pro quo" test, 
however, and seems not to be an independent criterion. This was 
explicitly recognized in Bingler v. Johnson, where the Court (following 
the IRS' own interpretation) termed the benefit test merely an adjunct to 
the compensation issue. 136 Subsequent decisions confirmed this view 
and regarded the Johnson decision as having melded the "principal 
purpose," "control," and "compensation" tests into a single test. 137 
This was a fortunate development, because scholarships by their 
nature benefit many different parties, and if taken seriously, the primary 
benefit test would be extremely difficult to apply. It seems safe to say that 
all scholarship grantors intend that the subsidized education be put to some 
useful purpose. If a student applied for financial aid with a statement of 
intent to be utterly unemployed in any capacity and that the education was 
purely for personal satisfaction or simply to meet a better class of people, 
it is probable that the student would not even be accepted for admission, 
let alone be awarded financial aid. By its nature a scholarship always 
benefits at least four different parties: (1) the student whose financial 
burden is reduced; (2) the school which can admit desirable students who 
could not otherwise afford to attend; (3) the public at large which profits 
generally from a better educated citizenry, and specifically from increased 
1, 1994, at 3 (stating that a 1990 study by the New York State Bar Association estimated 
that no more than 14% of the overall civil legal needs of the poor were being met). 
The situation is hardly better on the criminal side. Public Defender offices are 
everywhere understaffed and underfunded. Because of excessive caseloads, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court recently created a rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in Section E of Orleans Parish Criminal District Court. See State v. Peart, 621 
So.2d 780 (La. 1993). 
135. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67. 
136. 394 U.S. 746, 758 n.32 (1969); quoted supra in text accompanying note 54. 
137. See, e.g., Kellogg v. United States, 79-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 19586 (D. Minn. 
1979). 
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availability of highly skilled services; and (4) governments at all levels 
(federal, state, and local) which benefit from the prosperity which is 
generally associated with increased levels of education through 
enhancement of tax revenues, reduction of expenditures · for welfare, 
unemployment, and crime control, and increased availability of qualified 
persons for government employment. To these beneficiaries may be 
added: (5) the grantor (in case the funds do not derive from the school 
itself) whose general or specific philanthropic aims are furthered. The 
question of who is the "primary" beneficiary is thus not a simple one, 138 
and it is fortunate that it is no longer necessary to pose the question 
independently of the compensation or quid pro quo test. 
C. The Quid Pro Quo Test 
1. Residency as Quid Pro Quo: Porten 
The Porten court held that in addition to failing to meet the literal 
terms of the § 108(f) safe harbor, the Alaska plan failed the quid pro quo 
test for scholarships as well. The court stated: "Petitioner earned her loan 
forgiveness by fulfilling a condition subsequent to the granting of the loan: 
completing her degree program and working in Alaska for a certain period 
of time. The offer of loan forgiveness thus represented consideration for 
remaining in Alaska." 139 
Completing the degree program obviously cannot be a forbidden quid 
pro quo because it is a condition of all scholarships that the grant be used 
for the student's education. 140 To regard the post-graduation residency 
requirement as valuable consideration raises a difficult question which the 
court overlooked entirely. Why should it be treated any differently than 
the pre-matriculation residency requirement of state universities which 
provide a tuition discount to residents but not to out-of-state students? No 
one has ever suggested that such discounts should be taxable as 
compensation for meeting the residency requirement. The residency 
requirement is intended simply to assure that the benefits of the subsidized 
education enhance the general welfare of the state. The typical one-year 
residency requirement is itself of no obvious value to the state, and it has 
been correctly held that its purpose is merely to serve as evidence that the 
student is a bona fide resident who intends to remain in the state 
138. See Myers, supra note 52, at 399-401. 
139. Porten v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1994, 1996 (1993). 
140. It is equally obvious that no forbidden services are involved in scholarships 
which are conditioned upon maintaining a certain grade point average or engaging in a 
particular field of concentration. 
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afterwards. 141 Intent to remain is more accurately measured after 
graduation, and that seems the sole purpose of the Alaska LRAP 
requirement. Thus the Porten residency requirement should be regarded 
as a condition to ensure the general welfare of the people of Alaska rather 
than as payment for services of any sort to the government which granted 
the funds. 142 
A final irony lies in the fact that Congress had determined earlier that 
the Alaska Permanent Fund dividend, which is paid to all Alaskans with 
residency as the sole qualification, 143 is eligible dividend income for 
purposes of the "kiddie tax" election under I.R.C. § l(g)(7). 144 Because 
the kiddie tax applies only to unearned income, it appears to follow that 
residency is not a service performed for the state. Compensation for 
services is earned income and not subject to the kiddie tax in the first 
141. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (holding that state may not impose 
irrebuttable rules defining residency which arbitrarily prevent applicants for in-state 
tuition reduction from proving bona fide intent to remain domiciled in state). 
142. Except perhaps indirectly, because to the extent that the state population 
prospers and increases, so will the tax revenues and the power of the government. Note 
that states are in constant and intense competition with one another to attract businesses 
from elsewhere and to retain those already in the state, using a variety of means such as 
tax holidays, preferential rates of borrowing, use of public lands, exemptions from 
regulatory restrictions, and the like, all of which are of economic benefit to the recipient. 
No one has ever suggested that such benefits should be taxable to the recipient as 
compensation for the "service" or quid pro quo of coming to or remaining in the state. 
To the extent the question has ever been considered at all, such benefits are treated as 
tax-free gifts. For example, a state or municipal grant of land to a corporation as an 
inducement for development is treated as a tax-free contribution to capital. See Treas. 
Reg. § 1.118-1 (1960). 
143. See ALAsKA STAT. § 43.23.005(a) (1995). 
144. I.R.C. § l(g)(7) (1994). The election applies to children's unearned income 
"only from interest and dividends (including Alaska Permanent Fund dividends)." Id. 
§ l(g)(7)(A)(i), enacted by§ 6005 of Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3686. Indeed, enactment of the I.R.C. § l(g)(7) 
election to include children's unearned income on parents' returns was prompted by 
complaints from the Alaska delegation regarding the burden of filing kiddie tax returns 
for the Permanent Fund dividend. 
Permanent Fund dividends were held taxable as gross income in Beattie v. United 
States, 635 F. Supp. 481 (D. Alaska 1986) (holding a Permanent Fund dividend not to 
be a gift, but similar to a corporate dividend because it is distributed pursuant to statute 
whose stated purpose was to fulfill state's duty and obligation to its citizens without 
mention of charity or generosity), ajf'd sub nom. Griesen v. United States, 831 F.2d 916 
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988). 
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place. 145 Of course it is always possible that Congress might have 
intended to regard state benefits provided solely for residency as earned 
income for some purposes but not others. However, no very good reason 
to do so leaps to mind. 
It might be argued that the employment requirement, rather than mere 
residency, represents the forbidden quid pro quo. The Porten court did 
not explore this possibility. The loan agreement in Porten did not require 
the participant to be employed in Alaska, as the court erroneously stated. 
It required only that the participant must either work in Alaska or be 
subject to Alaska state income tax, thus permitting employment out of 
state if residency is maintained. In addition, each post-graduation year 
spent attending a college or university within Alaska counted as a year of 
"employment. " 146 Under these circumstances, the court was probably 
correct to consider residency rather than employment to be the primary 
condition for the loan forgiveness. A requirement simply to be employed 
in any capacity whatever, including self-employment or as a student, is so 
broad that it can hardly be regarded as a quid pro quo to the grantor. 147 
It is merely a condition to assure that the subsidized education be 
subsequently put to some-any-useful purpose. As argued above, this is 
an implied condition of all scholarships. 148 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the IRS' litigating position in Porten 
seems curiously inconsistent with the IRS' own ruling position which finds 
no quid pro quo in public-service legal and medical education grants 
which require broad service conditions subsequent that are "in accordance 
with usual patterns of employment." 149 It is surely no more unusual to 
expect Alaska residents to remain in Alaska than to expect primary-care 
physicians to practice primary-care medicine. 
145. It can no longer be argued that the Alaska LRAP is "primarily for the benefit 
of the grantor" despite the lack of any forbidden services, because as explained above 
the primary-benefit test is a dead letter. See discussion supra part ID.B. 
146. See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.00S(a) (1995). 
147. See supra note 123. The most natural interpretation of "payment for services" 
is of course payment by the beneficiary of the services to the provider in a direct 
exchange or quid pro quo. The language cannot be interpreted as referring to any and 
all services of whatever kind. For example, it cannot apply to services performed for 
grantee's own benefit, because that would read the scholarship exclusion out of the 
statute altogether. Congress obviously did not intend to disqualify scholarships paid for 
students to study and do research or writing because that is the very essence of a 
qualifying scholarship. 
148. See text accompanying notes 137-138. 
149. See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text. 
288 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
2. Public Service as Quid Pro Quo 
It is quite clear that scholarship status would not be disturbed if 
grantors earmarked certain scholarships solely for students who profess an 
intention to enter the teaching profession, 150 public interest law, or 
family-practice medicine for the poor. Grantors might go further and limit 
eligibility to those who have already provided evidence of public-
spiritedness through a prior history of charitable volunteer work. Such a 
restriction would certainly not imperil the exempt status of a scholarship. 
A still more effective way of ensuring that students will honor their 
expressed intention to enter public service in the learned professions is to 
wait until they have actually done so before awarding the scholarship. 
However, because students need the scholarship in order to obtain the 
professional education in the first place, it is impossible to apply the 
actual-service test until the funds have already been advanced. Thus the 
scholarship must be structured either in the form of loan forgiveness, or 
as an outright grant which must be repaid if the service commitment is not 
met, which is very nearly the same thing. 151 This is the essential reason 
for structuring a scholarship as an LRAP. 
If the IRS were to disallow a legal LRAP because of the requirement 
of public interest service, it would rely upon Bingler v. Johnson and 
Revenue Ruling 73-256, as it did in Porten and in its own NHSC 
Information Letter. 152 As noted above,153 Johnson was a case 
involving an ongoing employer-employee relationship and is all but 
150. See, e.g., Olick v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 479 (1979) (holding that stipend 
to Native Alaskan for engagement in the Alaska Rural Teacher Training Corps was 
excludible as scholarship where student teaching did not replace paid teachers and there 
was no contractual commitment to later employment; "mere hope" of recruitment into 
school system insufficient to defeat donative intent). But see Rev. Rut. 77-44, 1977-1 
C.B. 355 (holding that grants to college students who profess willingness to serve in 
public school system of particular state for two years after graduation are not tax-free 
scholarships despite foundation's treatment of commitment as moral only). Revenue 
Ruling 77-44 relied upon MacDonald v. Commissioner, 52 T .C. 3 86 (1969) (holding that 
study grant by IBM to IBM employee was taxable despite absence of contractual 
commitment to return to IBM employment; reasonable expectation sufficient). Reliance 
on MacDonald seems inapposite because there the private employer was the grantor and 
past services could reasonably be regarded as the direct quid pro quo. 
151. See discussion supra part 11.C. 
152. See supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text. 
153. See text accompanying supra note 63. 
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irrelevant to a service requirement which is not for the benefit of any 
grantor. 154 
Revenue Ruling 73-256 remains the only published ruling in which a 
general service requirement which did not benefit any grantor was held to 
vitiate the scholarship exclusion. The validity of this ruling is very 
doubtful for at least three reasons. First, the ruling was specifically 
disapproved by Congress as a misinterpretation of Treasury Regulation § 
1.117-4(c) when Congress enacted the predecessor of I.R.C. § 108(f).155 
Second, Revenue Ruling 73-256 was itself a complete reversal of the 
IRS' longstanding position that the Mississippi and NDEA plans were 
excludible scholarships. 156 Though purportedly based upon Bingler v. 
Johnson, 157 in fact, nothing at all in the Johnson decision supported the 
IRS' volte-face. 158 The ruling's reliance upon the Supreme Court's "no-
strings" and "quid pro quo" language was either a misunderstanding or a 
pretext for some other reason which I have been unable to discover. 
Third, the IRS' former pro-taxpayer position in private letter rulings 
and general counsel memoranda for thirteen years from 1958 until 1971 
was longstanding, well-reasoned, 159 and closer in time to the 1954 
enactment of l.R.C. § 117 and the 1956 promulgation of the applicable 
regulations. Under general principles of interpreting administrative 
regulations, all three factors lend weight to preferring the IRS' former 
154. It is clear that the Johnson Court meant no more than that a scholarship cannot 
be excluded if it is in fact a bargained-for exchange of money or money's worth for 
services to a grantor. Even if the Court intended to include such "strings attached" as 
public interest work for third parties-and it clearly did not so intend-such a statement 
would be pure dictum because it is irrelevant to the Johnson fact situation. 
155. See discussion supra part II.F. 
156. See discussion supra part II.C. 
157. See discussion supra part ILE. 
158. In neither the NDEA nor the Mississippi plan LRAP was there any 
employment, independent contractor, or other service relationship between the taxpayer 
and either the ultimate grantor of the funds or the institution which selected the loan 
recipient. Neither grantor had the right to supervise or direct the student's post-graduate 
services, nor did either grantor receive any direct financial benefit from the taxpayer's 
services, unlike the direct barter in Johnson. The only benefit received by the LRAP 
grantors was the indirect and charitable one of helping to steer better medical and 
educational services to the public. The recipient was at all times free to satisfy the loan 
conditions through an extremely wide variety of possible employment (or self-
employment) of the recipient's own choice. 
159. See discussion supra part II.C. 
290 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
position over its inexplicable change of mind in Revenue Ruling 73-
256.160 
Even if Revenue Ruling 73-256 were to be regarded as good law, it 
can be distinguished from the service requirements under legal LRAPs. 
There is at least some financial nexus between the state government as 
grantor and the state's interest in providing medical care to its poor 
because the state might feel obliged to satisfy these needs in some other 
way at greater cost. But there is no such nexus in legal LRAPs. There 
is no conceivable financial benefit to, say, NYU if one of its graduates 
serves as a public defender in California. 161 
The case for exclusion is even stronger where the sole condition of 
loan forgiveness is fmancial need. Acceptance of a low salary from a 
third-party employer is certainly not a service for the benefit of the 
grantor. 162 Such an LRAP differs from a traditional need-based 
scholarship only insofar as need is measured ex post rather than ex ante. 
To some extent, however, loan forgiveness based upon post-graduate need 
alone can serve as a proxy for public service, and in fact at least three 
legal LRAPs, those of NYU, Harvard and Yale, 163 are structured in 
precisely this way. 
The fact that law school LRAPs are not publicly funded as required 
under I.R.C. § 108(f) should not affect the conclusion that they do not 
involve services within the meaning of I.R.C. § 117(c). If the public-
funding requirement has any purpose at all other than simply to identify 
the Mississippi and NDEA plans and their congeners, it could only be to 
160. See Colin Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. 
PA. L. REV. 549, 562 n.95 (1985), who (in a slightly different context) sets forth ten 
factors that the Supreme Court has considered in deciding the validity of administrative 
interpretations, of which the first four seem directly relevant: 
Id. 
A partial list of the factors cited by the Court would include: (1) whether 
the agency construction was rendered contemporaneously with the statute's 
passage, see, e.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 
294, 315 (1933); (2) whether the agency's construction is of longstanding 
application, see, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 
(1974); (3) whether the agency has maintained its position consistently (even 
if infrequently), see, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293 (1981); (4) 
whether the public has relied on the agency's interpretation, see, e.g., Udall 
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 18 (1965) •... 
161. The reverse is probably true. Lawyers who are successful in private practice 
are surely more likely to make contributions to their alma mater, or at least more 
substantial ones. 
162. Phillips & Hatfield agree that LRAPs with low income as the sole criterion 
should probably be tax-free. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
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insure that the benefit of the required services is directed to government-
approved employment. If so, this would raise no obstacle because nearly 
all legal aid and public defenders' offices are in fact already funded in 
whole or in part by government contributions. 164 
The following Part considers the quid pro quo test under the law of 
gifts and charitable contributions and argues that the quid pro quo test for 
scholarships should be the same, viz., whether the "quo" constitutes a 
return of valuable goods or services to the donor. 
3. Gifts and Charitable Contributions 
Although as a technical matter scholarships have been governed by 
l.R.C. § 117 rather than l.R.C. § 102 since 1954, 165 many courts have 
been willing to consider the "detached and disinterested generosity" test 
for gifts under Duberstein as relevant to scholarships, including the Porten 
court. As noted above, 166 the Johnson Court's quid pro quo language 
requiring the grantor to be "disinterested" echoes Duberstein, and 
Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4( c) is itself in effect a reimportation of pre-
1939 gift law into the 1954 scholarship provision. 167 Most recently, in 
Spiegelman v. Commissioner, 168 the Tax Court rested its decision that 
a postgraduate award was a "fellowship" upon Duberstein and upon a 
lengthy discussion of pre-1954 law under which scholarships were tested 
as gifts. 169 
For tax purposes, the disinterested intent of the donor is not negated 
merely because the gift requires the donee to meet some condition, unless 
the condition is of direct economic benefit to the donor. For example, a 
164. The Legal Services Corporation, for example, which funds hundreds of legal 
aid societies throughout the country, was established by Congress in 1974 and received 
a $400 million appropriation by Congress in 1994. It received another $242 million from 
other sources of which about $48 million were donations from individuals or non-
governmental charities. See LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 7 
(1994). 
In addition, the Legal Aid Society of New York is the largest provider of both civil 
and criminal legal services to the poor in New York City. See LEGAL Alo SOCIETY, 
1993 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1993). Its total funding for 1993 was $137 .7 million, of which 
only $6.4 million came from private donations. Id. at 57. 
165. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text. 
166. See supra note 55. 
167. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
168. 102 T.C. 394 (1994) (holding that postdoctoral research grant to geologist was 
a fellowship and not subject to employment payroll taxes, though fellowship was taxable 
because taxpayer was not a degree candidate). 
169. See id. at 406. 
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prenuptial transfer of valuable property on condition that the recipient 
marry the transferor is excludible as a gift. 170 Payment of $5000 to a 
nephew for fulfilling a promise to refrain from drinking, smoking and 
swearing until _age twenty-one is excludible as a gift rather than taxable as 
compensation, because the conditions are for the benefit of the donee 
rather than the donor. 171 The fact that payment may be pursuant to an 
enforceable contract is no barrier to gift treatment. For example, payment 
of an enforceable pledge to a charity is a gift qualifying for the deduction 
under I.R.C. § 170(a) even if actual payment is pursuant to contract or 
even made under coercion after a change of mind. 172 The origin of the 
claim is a promise which is donative. 
Similarly, bequests are excludible under I.R.C. § 102(a) even if the 
beneficiary must fulfill conditions precedent or subsequent. For example, 
a bequest is tax-free even if subject to a condition that the beneficiary 
must marry, or not marry, or join the marines, or any other condition 
which is of no economic benefit to the testator. If the bequest is in effect 
the payment of a debt for valuable services performed, however, it is not 
taxfree but rather includible as compensation. 173 
Essentially the same tests of disinterested intent and lack of valuable 
quid pro quo apply to determine whether a donation is deductible under 
I.R.C. § 170(a) as a charitable contribution. 174 Restricted or conditional 
170. This is true even if the gift imposes a further condition that the bride must 
abandon marital rights to the transferor's property. See Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 
63. This remains true even though such a transfer is outside the literal terms of I.R.C 
§ 1041 enacted in 1984 which treats transfers between spouses and former spouses 
incident to divorce as gifts. 
171. See Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891); see also Smith v. 
Commissioner, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 706 (1955), aff'd 249 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1967) 
(holding parent's transfer of farmland to son enforceable where conditioned on son's 
finishing school, abandoning plans to play professional football, and agreeing to develop 
land). 
172. See Commissioner v. RailJoint Co., 61 F.2d 751, 752 (1932). 
173. See Wolder v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that 
decedent's bequest of corporate stock to lawyer in exchange for prior legal services 
performed was taxable compensation, applying Duberstein test). 
174. The House and Senate Reports on§ 170 of the 1954 Code both define "gifts" 
for purposes of the deduction for charitable contributions as payments "made with no 
expectation of a financial return commensurate with the amount of the gift." S. REP. 
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 
A44 (1954). 
The courts have applied interchangeably both the subjective intent test of Duberstein 
and an objective quid pro quo test. Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 
1971) (allowing deductions for donor's bargain sales to churches, hospitals, and the Red 
Cross because donor's motive was to foster donee's charitable activities but denying 
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contributions are quite common and do not endanger the deduction in the 
absence of an economic quid pro quo. For example, it is unquestionable 
that one may deduct the value of a painting donated to a museum on 
condition that the museum restore it or maintain it on display, despite the 
fact that the condition imposes a requirement of services to be performed. 
The services are for the benefit of the museum and the public, and provide 
no economic quid pro quo to the donor. 175 Similarly, a gift to a 
university to establish a professorial chair in a particular field of learning 
does not constitute a forbidden quid pro quo even if the donor's name is 
memorialized or favorite cause is furthered. 176 The donor's satisfaction 
from a restricted gift is altogether irrelevant177 unless it has the character 
of an economic return. 178 For example, in Revenue Ruling 81-307, 179 
the IRS held that a gift to a police department was deductible although it 
was made to provide a reward for the apprehension of the murderer of the 
donor's child, on the ground that the reward served a public purpose and 
the benefit to the donor was "incidental. " 180 Similarly, the millions of 
dollars that Michael Milken has reportedly donated to foundations for 
research on prostate cancer of which he is himself a victim are deductible 
deduction for selling sewing machines to schools at a discount because donor's 
predominate motive was to encourage students to use taxpayer's products in future 
years). There, the Court of Claims stated that the subjective approach of disinterested 
generosity need not be wrestled with and that the proper test is whether "the benefits 
received, or expected to be received, are substantial, and meaning by that, benefits 
greater than those that inure to the general public. . . . " Id. Cf. Hernandez v. 
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 690 (1989) (stating that the words "'contribution or gift' . 
. . [are] intended to differentiate between unrequited payments to qualified recipients and 
payments made to such recipients in return for goods or services.") 
175. Cf. Singer, 449 F.2d at 423 (stating that artists cannot deduct donations of 
paintings to museums from income tax if the transfer provides benefits so substantial that 
it creates quid pro quo to the donor). 
176. See 2 BORIS I. BITIKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
OF INCOME, EsTATES AND GIFTS 1 35.1.3 (2d ed. 1990). 
177. It has been argued that the charitable contribution is questionable precisely 
because such non-financial satisfactions and honors should be treated as a form of 
compensation, but this is not the Jaw. See generally Mark G. Kelman, Personal 
Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit 
Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979). 
178. Treating such restrictions as if they were an economic quid pro quo might 
arguably undermine the deduction under I.R.C. § 170(a) altogether because it is an 
implied condition of all charitable contributions that the recipient wiJJ use the gift for one 
of its legitimate charitable aims. 
179. 1981-2 C.B. 78. 
180. See Joan O'C. Hamilton, Milken vs. Cancer, Bus. WK., Jan. 9, 1995, at 36-
37. 
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gifts even if his primary motive is to save his own life. An LRAP which 
is intended solely to provide legal services to the needy seems more 
selfless and charitable than the above examples, and should be regarded 
a fortiori as donative in nature. 
By contrast, if the donor receives a direct financial benefit as a quid 
pro quo, an otherwise qualifying gift is nondeductible. 181 For example, 
a contribution to a qualifying private school is not deductible if it is in 
effect a payment of tuition for the benefit of the donor's child. 182 
If the quid pro quo test for scholarships under I.R.C. § 117(c) is 
interpreted as equivalent to and in pari materia with that of I.R.C. § 
170(a) and Bingler v. Johnson, as I think it should be, an illuminating 
comparison can be made between the tax treatment of the grantor and the 
grantee of a law school LRAP. It is beyond question that an individual 
donor is entitled to deduct as a charitable contribution a gift to a 
qualifying law school which is earmarked for the funding of LRAPs, 
because the donor receives no economic value in exchange and is merely 
specifying a charitable aim. 183 It would then be a direct contradiction 
to assert that the LRAP recipient should be taxed for fulfilling a quid pro 
quo to that grantor, because the deduction is allowed only on condition 
that no such quid pro quo exists. 
Of course the private donor is only one grantor of the LRAP, and the 
law school which selects the recipients and administers the grants is 
another. Salaries are taxable even when paid by a nonprofit institution out 
of previously deducted contributions. That an individual's endowment of 
a law professorship may be deductible as a charitable gift does not prevent 
the professor's salary from being taxable compensation. In the case of an 
LRAP, however, it is difficult to see why the law school stands in any 
different position than the individual grantor. If, say, NYU cancels tuition 
loans in exchange for a graduate's employment for a California public 
defender's office, it receives no more economic quid pro quo than Melvyn 
and Barbara Weiss who provided the other half of the funds. Both 
181. I.R.C. § 6115, enacted by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 
now requires charities to disclose and value any quid pro quo contribution in excess of 
$75. I.R.C. § 6115(b) defines a quid pro quo contribution as a contribution partly in 
consideration for goods or services provided to the payor by the donee organization. 
Intangible religious benefits are exempt if they are generally not sold in a commercial 
transaction outside the donative context. Pub. L. No. 103-66, tit. XID, § 13173(a), 107 
Stat. 312, 456. 
182. Rev. Ru!. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46. 
183. Unless the gift is earmarked for the donor's own child, and is merely an 
attempt to deduct tuition by laundering the funds through a charitable organization. See 
id. 
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grantors share the identical purpose of improving legal services to the 
poor, and neither receives any other return than the satisfaction of doing 
so. 
D. Financial Need 
The courts have often regarded financial need tests as a factor pointing 
toward eligibility as a scholarship and also as evidence of disinterested 
charity. For example, in Lange v. Commissioner, 184 a stipend from 
Antioch School of Law was held to be a tax-free scholarship despite the 
fact that the student was required to perform services in a legal-aid clinic. 
The Tax Court based its decision upon the fact that all students had to 
perform similar services as part of the curriculum, and that financial aid 
was awarded strictly on the basis of need. 185 Conversely, in Jamieson 
v. Commissioner, 186 the Tax Court found that payments to a teaching 
assistant were compensation rather than a scholarship chiefly because the 
payments were in return for services and without regard to financial 
need. 187 
The fact that public interest LRAPs are in large part based upon 
financial need helps to support their characterization as scholarships. 
Nearly all scholarships today are need-tested at the front end. 188 
Students who have the income or assets to pay the full price of higher 
education at the time of admission are generally required to do so, and this 
ineligibility generally applies to cancelable LRAPs as well. 189 However, 
financial need, like commitment to public service, is more accurately 
measured after the student's education is completed. If the student enters 
low-paying work upon graduation, the burden of repayment is greater, and 
the justification for need-based, tax-free, educational loan relief is greater 
than that for an initial outright grant. If a student becomes suddenly 
wealthy after graduation, an outright grant which might have funded a 
needy student instead has in effect been wasted. 
184. 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421 (1981). 
185. Id. at 1422. 
186. 51 T.C. 635 (1969). 
187. See also Rockswold v. United States, 620 F.2d 166 (1980) (holding that 
medical fellowship was taxable as compensation for services in part because payments 
not based on financial need); Weissfisch v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 391 
(1974) (same regarding medical residency). 
188. See generally The Nation, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION ALMANAC, 
Aug. 28, 1991, at 3, cited in Joseph Dodge, Scholarships Under the Income Tax Act, 46 
TAX LAW. 697, 709 n.64 (1993). 
189. See generally NAPIL REPORT, supra note 23. 
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The point is particularly applicable to legal education. Senator 
Bumper's explanation of Senate Bill 914 makes the point very clearly. 190 
The median salary of 1991 law graduates who took public service work 
was $25,000, while those who went into private practice earned a median 
salary of $51,000. 191 The enormous burden of law school loans is a 
great deterrent to those who might otherwise enter public interest work, 
and this is the principal reason why so many law schools have instituted 
LRAPs. 192 
The chief problem with characterization of an LRAP as a scholarship 
is that the financial aid is provided after the student's graduation, and 
sometimes many years afterwards. This problem is the subject of the next 
Part. 
E. Timing: Can Postgraduate Aid be a Scholarship? 
Treasury Regulation § 1.117-3 defines "scholarship" as "an amount 
paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of, a student, whether an 
undergraduate or a graduate, to aid such individual in pursuing his 
studies. "193 The IRS might take the position that financial aid paid long 
after graduation is neither 'paid to a student' nor 'intended to aid the 
student in pursuing his studies' because the studies have long been 
completed. There is apparently no published authority on this timing 
question regarding scholarships, although there is one ruling in the related 
area of employer-provided educational assistance under I.R.C. § 127. 194 
In PLR 8714035,195 the IRS ruled that tuition loan cancellations 
190. 139 CONG. REC. S5647-5648 (daily ed. May 6, 1993) (statement by Sen. 
Bumpers); see supra text accompanying notes 8-13. 
191. Id. at S5648. 
192. Id. (citing figures supplied by NAPIL REPORT, supra note 23). 
193. The proposed regulations intended to apply to grants made after 1986 define 
"scholarship" in much the same way. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(3), 53 Fed. 
Reg. 21,688 (1988) (first sentence). 
194. I.R.C. § 127 grants an exclusion of up to $5250 per year of employer-provided 
educational assistance provided that it is pursuant to a written plan and is 
nondiscriminatory. I.R.C. § 127 expired by its terms on Dec. 31, 1994. However, 
Congress may reinstate the provision retroactively, as it has done several times in the 
past. 
The exclusion was repealed in 1988 for graduate-level courses which might lead to 
an advanced degree by § 4001(a) of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3643, but this restriction was lifted two years later 
by§ 11403 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 
104 Stat. 1388, 1473. 
195. Jan. 2, 1987. 
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provided by a college to a full-time teacher did not qualify for the 
exclusion under I.R.C. § 127 because (among other reasons) the 
cancellations took place after the teacher had already completed her 
Master's degree and therefore did not provide any incentive for her to 
continue her studies. 196 It appears significant that the ruling did not state 
as an additional ground that the timing of the loan cancellations prevented 
scholarship treatment. 197 The ruling is unlikely to present a significant 
obstacle to excludibility of LRAPs as scholarships because the timing issue 
is probably not the same as it relates to I.R.C. §§ 127 and 117. For 
example, loan cancellation could be used to circumvent the annual 
exclusion limit of $5250 by deferring the excess to a later year through a 
loan to be forgiven when the employee will be within that dollar limit. 
Congress has demonstrated concern for this issue in the legislative history 
of I.R.C. § 127. 198 
The IRS has never shown any concern for the timing issue as it relates 
to scholarships. Disallowance of the scholarship exclusion for the 
Mississippi and NDEA plans was based solely upon the quid pro quo issue 
without mention of any timing problem. 199 Both plans involved loan 
forgiveness which took place long after the participants' education was 
completed. Under both plans, as under law school LRAPs, the 
forgiveness takes place during the participants' professional working 
career. In effect the loan-cancellation scholarships were treated as 
equivalent to outright grants, and correctly so because there is little if any 
economic difference between an outright grant which must be repaid if a 
196. It also did not qualify because it was not pursuant to a written plan as required 
under I.R.C. § 127(b). 
197. Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 8714035 (Jan. 2, 1987) also ruled that the loan cancellations 
were not a scholarship because they were provided in exchange for services as a full-time 
employee, and in fact the college reported the amounts as wages on a Form W-2. 
Id. 
198. See H.R. REP. No. 1049, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 7 (1984) which states: 
The committee recognizes that an employee cannot avoid the [then] 
$5,000 limit by electing to forego receipt of reimbursements to another taxable 
year because the employee is in constructive receipt of the amounts in the 
current year. In addition, the committee intends that employers will report to 
an employee, who separates from service with the employer during the taxable 
year, the value of the educational assistance benefits received by the employee 
during the year. 
199. See supra text accompanying notes 57-67. 
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condition subsequent is not met, and a loan which will be canceled if the 
condition is met. 200 
Proposed Regulation § 1.117-6(c)(3) states that "[a] scholarship or 
fellowship grant also may be in the form of a reduction in the amount 
owed by the recipient to an educational organization for tuition, room and 
board, or any other fee." This provision has no analog in the former 
regulations, but it does not appear intended to make any change in prior 
law.201 
For example, a tuition loan which converts to a grant upon the 
achievement of a required grade average, or successful completion of 
studies, would clearly have been excludible under any version of prior 
law. The current express recognition of loan cancellation as a means of 
awarding scholarships, without any explicit concern over timing, suggests 
that the exclusion applies even if the forgiveness takes place after 
graduation, and perhaps even if long afterwards. 
The phrase 'owed to an educational organization' may raise more 
difficult questions, however. If the law school forgives amounts which 
are owed to itself, the forgiveness seems clearly within the proposed 
regulations. Typically, however, the law school itself is not the holder of 
the note representing the original student loans, but rather a financial 
institution which has disbursed funds to the school and/or the student at 
the direction of the school. The law school either makes the graduate 
cancelable interim loans with which to make payments on the original 
student loans, or outright grants of cash for the same purpose. 
Taking the interim-loan format first, such loans are 'owed to an 
educational institution,' but they raise another timing question because 
they are not merely forgiven many years after graduation, but also 
advanced after the student's studies are completed. Thus it might be 
questioned whether the interim loan forgiveness is a reduction of an 
amount owed "for tuition, room and board, or any other fee." On the 
other hand, LRAP interim loans are in effect simply a refinancing of the 
original student loans and can plausibly be regarded as relating back to 
them. A good analogy may be found in the rules for deducting qualified 
home mortgage interest under I.R.C. § 163(h). Qualifying acquisition 
200. Except for a different timing problem: for tax purposes, a non-qualifying 
scholarship grant is taxable in the year of receipt, but a non-qualifying scholarship loan 
is not taxable until the year in which it is canceled. 
201. Nor does the change in the regulations defining "scholarship" which formerly 
referred to "student" and now to "individual." The immediately preceding first sentence 
of Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.117-6(c)(3) which defines "scholarship or fellowship" reads: 
"(i) In general. Generally, a scholarship or fellowship grant is a cash amount paid or 
allowed to, or for the benefit of, an individual to aid such individual in the pursuit of 
study or research." 
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indebtedness under I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i) includes any refinancing of 
such indebtedness even though the refinancing is not for the purpose of 
acquiring a residence because the residence is already owned. The 
refinancing replaces the original acquisition loan and is quite sensibly 
treated as relating back to it as a substitute. Similar treatment for interim-
loan LRAPs seems reasonable, if not compelling. 
A related problem is raised by the fact that LRAP cancellation is not 
ordinarily made pursuant to the terms of the original student loan, in 
contrast to the Mississippi and NDEA plans and as required under I.R.C. 
§ 108(f)(l). Presumably the purpose of this limitation202 is to ensure 
that the loan forgiveness relates directly back to the educational assistance 
which was "to aid [the] individual in the pursuit of study or research," 
and is not a merely an employment arrangement. However, this should 
not present an insuperable problem if the LRAP is already in place at the 
time the student begins law school. There is no apparent reason why the 
student cannot rely upon the LRAP program when incurring the 
independent student loans and in effect look to the LRAP as present 
assurance of financial aid for current studies. It should be noted, 
however, that this argument may weaken the case for exclusion for 
students whose LRAP programs allow them to participate even if they 
had already graduated before the LRAP program was instituted. 
Cash grants should be treated in the same way as interim-loan 
cancellation and reduction of original debt because all three have the same 
economic effect. Assurance that cash grants and interim loans will 
actually be used to pay down the educational debt is generally provided by 
limiting eligibility to participants who are currently in compliance with 
their loan obligations. 203 If loan funds are provided by a lending 
institution at the direction of a law school, the benefit to the student is the 
same whether the LRAP makes payments directly to the participant or to 
the lending institution on behalf of the participant. Either way, from the 
participant's perspective, the cash payments are economically equivalent 
to a reduction of debt held by the law school itself. From the law 
school's point of view the result is also the same. If the school has 
already received funds from a third-party lender on the student's behalf 
and refunds the amounts either to the lender or to the student, it has 
simply provided a rebate and retains the remaining net proceeds (if any) 
as the final price of tuition. If the school itself holds the debt and reduces 
202. Assuming that it has any purpose at all other than to loosely identify the 
Mississippi, NDEA, and similar plans to which it applies. 
203. See NAPIL REPORT, supra note 23. Note also that for scholarships generally, 
there is no need to trace particular grant dollars to particular expenditures for qualified 
tuition. Prop. Reg. § 1.117-6(e). 
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it, the school will similarly end up with recovery of the remaining debt (if 
any) as the final price. 
1. Exclusion Limited to Tuition 
The scholarship exclusion for LRAPs must be limited to loans for 
tuition, and possibly for law school tuition alone. If the LRAP also pays 
down loans for living expenses, there is no argument for the exclusion 
because after 1986, l.R.C. § 117(b)(2) has limited the exclusion to tuition 
and fees. Some LRAP programs include financial assistance for 
undergraduate loans as well. To the extent such loans were made for 
living expenses there is again no argument for exclusion under l.R.C. § 
117. 
This is true despite the fact that l.R.C. § 108(f) has not been amended 
to conform to l.R.C. § 117(b)(2), so that loan cancellation programs 
which qualify under l.R.C. § 108(f) apparently still permit exclusion of 
forgiven loans for living expenses. Congress seems to have erred in 
failing to conform the two provisions. 204 
Whether LRAP forgiveness of undergraduate tuition loans might 
qualify for the scholarship exclusion is a more difficult question. There 
is no reason in principle why a law school cannot grant a scholarship for 
undergraduate education, and if a scholarship may be granted for legal 
education after graduation, the same should arguably be true for 
undergraduate tuition. On the other hand, the timing issue makes this 
doubtful. It seems difficult to argue that post-J.D. LRAPs further the 
participant's undergraduate education which was already completed years 
earlier. Certainly it would be unusual for an undergraduate to know of 
and rely upon a law school LRAP for current financial aid in college, 
assuming arguendo that such reliance is a proper test for the 
exclusion. 205 On the other hand, LRAP benefits for undergraduate 
204. This difference cannot· be defended, and is probably an oversight due to the 
original error of not codifing I.R.C. § 108(t) at I.R.C. § 117 where it belongs. See 
supra note 71. Note that Senator Bumpers' proposed amendments to I.R.C. § 108 would 
have allowed LRAP recipients a bigger exclusion than is available under I.R.C. § 117. 
See 139 CONG. REC. S5647 (daily ed. May 6, 1993). 
205. The definition of "scholarship" under the regulations as aid to "further" the 
recipient's studies can be read as implying that an element of inducement to study is 
required. It is by no means clear, however, that any such requirement exists. For 
example, scholarships are often awarded in situations where it is clear that the recipient 
will engage in the contemplated studies in any event, and the aid is intended merely to 
lure the student from one school to another. Also, the "honoraria" type of scholarship 
which civic groups give to high school students ordinarily cannot influence the recipient's 
educational choices because the amounts are usually too small and the timing too late. 
But their exclusion as scholarships has never been questioned. 
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tuition loans may be regarded as furthering the participants' legal 
education, because willingness to talce on law school indebtedness is likely 
to be influenced in part by the level of their college debts. The case for 
exclusion is less strong than for law school tuition indebtedness, but it is 
still good. 
2. Allocation to Law School Tuition 
Because the exclusion under l.R.C. § 117(b)(2) applies only to LRAP 
benefits to the extent they are allocable to qualified tuition and fees, an 
allocation problem arises where the LRAP pays down loans incurred for 
living expenses as well. If LRAP assistance for undergraduate tuition 
loans also does not qualify for the exclusion, a second allocation problem 
arises. 
If LRAPs want to maximize the exclusion for their participants, it 
would appear advisable for them to stipulate that loan forgiveness and/or 
cash payments apply first to law school tuition loans, then to 
undergraduate tuition loans, and finally to loans for living expenses. This 
would be possible in cases where the LRAP does not cover the full 
amount of a participant's current obligations. For example, suppose that 
the participant's current obligations are $600 per month, of which $400 
is for law school tuition loans, $100 for law school living expense loans, 
and $100 for undergraduate tuition loans. If the participant qualifies for 
$200 per month in LRAP benefits, it would be desirable for the participant 
and the school to allocate the entire $200 of benefits to the law school 
tuition loans. 206 
On the other hand, if the LRAP pays the full amount of the 
participant's current obligations, such a stipulation would have no effect 
because the participant must make payments currently on all loans at once. 
To determine the correct amount of the exclusion, it would be necessary 
to make a pro-rata allocation of the LRAP assistance among the various 
loans. Using the preceding example, if the participant qualifies for $600 
of monthly benefits, the $400 allocable to law school tuition would be 
excludible, and probably the $100 of college tuition as well, but not the 
$100 allocable to living expenses. 
Even if the exclusion is limited to law school tuition loan assistance, 
it would still be a very valuable benefit because it appears that at least 
two-thirds of the average law graduate's indebtedness is due to law school 
206. This approach might be permissible under Prop. Reg. § 1. ll 7-6(e), supra note 
203. However, the IRS might demand a pro-rata allocation. The most effective way to 
avoid this result would be for the LRAP to pay the entire benefit directly to the holder 
of the law school tuition loan. 
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tuition loans. m Thus even if LRAP aid were allocated to all of a 
graduate's student debts on a pro-rata basis, the exclusion would probably 
shield an average of at least two-thirds of the assistance. 
F. Is an LRAP a Tax-Free Price Adjustment? 
A bargain purchase of goods or services is ordinarily taxfree provided 
that it is not a disguised payment of compensation. A subsequent rebate 
of purchase price is also generally tax-free as a return of capital. Where 
the rebate arises from a sale of property on credit and takes the form of 
a reduction of debt, no income from cancellation of indebtedness arises 
and the reduction is treated as a tax-free adjustment to the purchase price 
under l.R.C. § 108(e)(5). 208 Although there appears to be no authority 
on point, there is no reason why a price rebate for services should not be 
treated in the same way. Thus a reduction of purchase-money debt by a 
seller of services should generally be taxfree. Scholarships may be 
regarded as a subset of such transactions. 
If loan forgiveness under an LRAP fails to qualify as a scholarship, 
it is presumably taxable only if it is COD income under I.R.C. § 
61(a)(12). Whether tuition loan forgiveness is taxable as COD is very 
problematic, however, for at least three closely related reasons: (1) it is 
unclear whether cancellation of debts incurred for services alone rather 
than money or property are taxable as COD; (2) even if debts incurred for 
services are subject to the COD rules, the value of tuition (and many other 
services) is so uncertain as to render doubtful the proper measure of 
income; and (3) forgiveness of tuition debt is more plausibly viewed as a 
price reduction than as an accession to wealth. 
The essential reason for taxing COD is that if the taxpayer has 
borrowed money taxfree and fails to repay it, the taxpayer is wealthier to 
the extent of the untaxed loan proceeds. It follows that unless the 
borrower has received valuable loan proceeds in exchange for the debt, 
cancellation of the debt does not result in any enrichment, and the courts 
207. At Stanford Law School, for example, average indebtedness for 1994 graduates 
was $55,000, of which $45,000 was for law school and $10,000 for undergraduate 
education. Of the $45,000 law school debt, 87% or $39,150 was for tuition loans. Thus 
71 % of total indebtedness was for law school tuition. Telephone Interview with Frank 
Brucato, Associate Dean of Stanford Law School (Mar. 2, 1995). If the analysis in text 
is correct, at least 71 % ofLRAP benefits would be excludible on a pro-rata basis even 
without making special allocations of benefits to law school tuition. Graduates of New 
York Law School appear to have a similar average breakdown of indebtedness, and the 
same is probably true at most law schools. The largest item of indebtedness by far is law 
school tuition. 
208. See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text. 
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have generally agreed. 209 It is clear that money and property count as 
loan proceeds for this purpose, but there are no reported cases of COD 
income arising from debts incurred for services, and it is uncertain 
whether I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) should apply at all in this situation.210 The 
enjoyment of services does not result in any increase in the taxpayer's 
wealth or ability to pay tax, and for that reason cancellation of a purchase-
money debt for services is arguably not a taxable enrichment either. 211 
Furthermore, the value of services is often not ascertainable in any 
objective manner. The fact that a price has been agreed upon between 
buyer and service provider does not necessarily fix the value of services, 
especially where the provider may charge vastly different prices to 
different customers for the same services.212 A public figure may 
charge a "standard" speaking fee, but wili often cut the price in half or to 
nothing at all depending on the audience addressed. General Colin Powell 
is reported to charge speaking fees of $60,000, 213 but it is impossible to 
determine the objective value of his speeches, or of anyone else's. For 
tax purposes its value can only be whatever the buyer actually pays. 
Physicians and surgeons often charge vastly different fees for identical 
services depending upon the patient's ability to pay. Tuition is very 
similar. The "sticker price" for tuition at a private college may be, say, 
$20,000, but only the wealthy actually pay it. Middle-class students may 
209. See generally Richard C.E. Beck, Is Compromise of a Tax Liability Itself 
Taxable? A Problem of Circularity in the Logic of Taxation, 14 VA. TAX REV. 153, 165-
173 (1994). 
210. The American Law Institute's Draft of a Federal Income Tax Statute proposed 
a codification of the COD income rules which would have defined "indebtedness" as 
including only those obligations which are incurred for cash, or for the acquisition of 
property where the debt was included in basis. See Stanley S. Surrey & William C. 
Warren, The Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute: Gross Income, 
Deductions, Accounting, Gains and Losses, Cancellation of Indebtedness, 66 HARV. L. 
REV. 761, 815-16 (1953). 
211. It is unclear whether a receipt of unearned services should be included in the 
tax base at all, whether directly or by way of debt cancellation. A promotional prize of 
cash or property is unquestionably taxable, but it seems doubtful whether a promotional 
free movie, dinner, or massage should be taxed if it is nontransferable. See Dodge supra 
note 188, at 708 n.59. A receipt of services should of course be taxable if the services 
have produced some asset which can be transferred for value, or if the taxpayer has a 
real or implied option to take cash instead (barter), as for example if the services are 
earned (nonqualifying fringe benefits). 
212. For example, some airlines offer "compassion" fares which are half or less 
than regular fares in order to enable people to visit relatives on short notice in an 
emergency. The price reduction is certainly not income. 
213. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Powell Deftly Deflecting Questions on Presidency, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at A12. 
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routinely receive "scholarships" based on need which reduce the price to, 
say, $10,000, and a poor but able student may be charged nothing at all. 
The purpose of all such cases of differential pricing is to capture consumer 
surplus. 214 The agreed price has no necessary relation to objective 
value. 
Cost to the school provides no clear measure of value either. All 
tuition, both public and private, is subsidized by private endowment or 
public taxes so that not even those who pay the full sticker price actually 
pay the full cost of higher education. 215 No one believes that such 
subsidies are taxable, but they do not differ in substance from a 
scholarship. 216 
The exclusion for scholarships is thus justifiable on a ground which 
is wholly independent of the exclusion for gifts. The actual price paid, net 
of scholarship, should be regarded as the true price of tuition for tax 
purposes and any discount, whether hidden or explicit, should be ignored 
altogether. 217 It is noteworthy that this view has been explicitly adopted 
by the Office of Management and Budget which dropped scholarships 
from its list of tax expenditures, explaining: 
from a strictly economic point of view, scholarships . . . are 
either gifts not conditioned on the performance of services, or 
they are "rebates" of educational costs by the institutions in which 
students are enrolled. Thus . . . the exclusion is not a tax 
214. One cannot ask the well-off to pay more than the "sticker price," and so it 
must be artificially increased to the maximum that the richest customers are willing to 
pay. In the tuition example, it would be more realistic to say the "true" price is $10,000 
if that is what most students actually pay. 
215. On the other hand, the government's measurement of such subsidies apparently 
makes a pro-rata allocation to each student of the entire cost of the educational 
institution, including the salaries of professors who are engaged largely in research and 
the cost of libraries and laboratories which are necessary for their research. See DIGEST 
OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS (1987), 
cited in Charlotte Crane, Scholarships and the Federal Income Tax Base, 28 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 63, 71 n.25 (1991). It may be questioned whether the subsidy is in fact the 
other way around, for there is no clear reason why students should pay for research 
which may be of little or no direct value to themselves. To the extent this may be true, 
tuition is overcharged rather than subsidized. 
216. See Crane, supra note 215, at 71. Professor Crane rightly points out that it 
is difficult to justify taxing tuition which is actually charged but not paid when the 
"invisible subsidy" is tax-free. 
217. See Dodge, supra note 188, at 701-11. Professor Dodge believes that although 
gifts should be taxable, scholarships should not be taxable because they are merely a 
"bargain purchase." 
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expenditure; the reference law does not include either gifts or 
price reductions in a taxpayer's gross income. 218 
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If this is so, it follows that cancellation of a debt for tuition simply adjusts 
the purchase price and should not be taxable quite apart from I.R.C. § 
117. According to this point of view, after Congress repealed the 
scholarship exclusion in 1986 for amounts other than qualified tuition and 
fees, there may no longer be any need for I.R.C. § 117(a) at all. 219 
A reduction of tuition debt by the school as lender and holder of the 
note should clearly qualify as a tax-free price reduction. The school has 
advanced nothing except its own services and facilities of unascertainable 
value. The case is not different if the rebate is in cash, however, because 
a purchase-money tuition loan from a third-party lender has still provided 
no cash to the borrower. The school receives the borrowed money, and 
the borrower has again received nothing except the school's services. 
The price-rebate argument would not apply, however, to the extent the 
rebate is earned by the recipient's barter of services in exchange.220 
This would appear to reopen the entire quid pro quo question which has 
plagued l.R.C. § 117. However, if the price-rebate approach provided an 
opportunity to reexamine the question without the accumulated baggage of 
erroneous law under I.R.C. § 117, the results might be very different. A 
taxable barter should be found only where the recipient performs valuable 
services for the direct economic benefit of the grantor (or seller, under the 
price-rebate analysis), as is the law for charitable contributions and gifts 
generally. The public interest (or low-income) conditions which LRAP 
participants must meet simply do not fit this description. 
218. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, 
FISCAL YEAR 1985, at G-28, quoted in Crane, supra note 215, at 68. 
219. The price-paid argument would not apply to cash scholarships which are used 
for living expenses, because the face amount of cash is of course its value, unlike the 
face amount of tuition. Pre-1986 I.R.C. § 117 therefore provided a valuable exclusion 
for such amounts. But scholarships for such amounts are no longer excluded by current 
I.R.C. § 117, and the price-reduction theory is therefore now coterminous with the 
scholarship exclusion except for the exclusion under§ 117(b)(2)(B) for books, supplies, 
and equipment. 
220. See Rev. Ru!. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60 (holding that barter of legal services for 
housepainting services is taxable on both sides to the extent of fair market value of 
services received). 
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G. Is an LRAP a Gift? 
The scholarship exclusion requires donative intent, or at least the same 
absence of any quid pro quo as for gifts and charitable contributions, and 
LRAPs appear to meet this. 221 The question may then arise, why 
should an LRAP not be excludible as a gift under l.R.C. § 102(a) in case 
it fails for some other reason (e.g., timing) to qualify as a scholarship? 
According to the Treasury Regulations § 1.117-3(a) and (c), the terms 
"scholarship" and "fellowship" do not include amounts provided by an 
individual where the grantor is motivated by family or philanthropic 
considerations.222 Such grants are excludible as gifts under I.R.C. § 
102(a),223 however, which is a more favorable treatment because it 
removes the grant from the restrictions of l.R.C. § 117.224 The evident 
purpose of the regulation is twofold: (1) to protect intra-family gifts 
which happen to be for educational expenses from the limitations ofl.R.C. 
§ 117; and (2) to safeguard the limitations of l.R.C. § 117 from end-run 
claims that ordinary institutional grants are fully excludible gifts. And yet 
the regulations do not state that all institutional grants must be tested by 
the scholarship rules alone. Although tax-free gifts are ordinarily made 
by individuals out of personal affection or charity, there is no statutory 
barrier to prevent an institution such as a law school from making gifts 
which might be excluded under I.R.C. § 102(a). For example, the 
Supreme Court held in United States v. Kaiser25 that strike benefits paid 
by a union to a nonunion striker were tax-free gifts where there was no 
requirement that the recipient perform any services such as picketing, and 
where the benefits were made out of charitable concern that the recipient 
had no means of supporting himself.226 Nor is the fact that LRAP 
221. See supra notes 165-183 and accompanying text. 
222. The same statement appears in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(3), 53 Fed. 
Reg. 21,688 (1988) which is intended to apply to post-1986 scholarships. 
223. See Rev. Rul. 61-66, 1961-1 C.B. 19 (holding that grant by individual to a 
university to disburse to a particular professor while on leave without pay in order to 
enable him to pursue research is excludible in full as a gift, and is not a fellowship 
because university merely acted as a conduit for individual's gift to another designated 
individual). 
224. Such as the limitations to degree candidates and to qualified tuition and fees 
under I.R.C. §§ 117(a) & (b). On the other hand, such a grant may be subject to gift 
tax to the extent the educational expense exclusion under I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(A) does not 
apply. 
225. 363 U.S. 299 (1960). 
226. Compare Osborne v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1895 (1995) (holding 
that strike payments were not gifts because, inter alia, they were not made on the basis 
of financial need). 
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payments are made pursuant to contract a necessary barrier to gift status 
because, as noted above, a payment pursuant to an enforceable promise 
may still be a gift, as in the case of a charitable pledge. 227 
Tax-free gifts may also be made by means of cancellation of debt, as 
for example when a father cancels a debt owed to him by his son. The 
IRS has ruled at least twice, in Revenue Ruling 78-46,228 and in PLR 
8839026,229 that cancellation of debts to governmental agencies is 
nontaxable for reasons of general public welfare when the reason for 
cancellation is relief of hardship.230 
On the other hand, although LRAP payments are based on financial 
need, they are not for relief of hardship or poverty as in the above cases. 
Moreover, even though LRAP benefits would probably pass the test of 
"detached and disinterested generosity," they are recurrent sources of 
funds upon which the recipient can rely and might thus be vulnerable to 
the analysis applied to tips and tokes: the recipient can and probably does 
regard them the equivalent of additional compensation. 231 Tips are paid 
to the service provider by the beneficiary of the services, however, unlike 
the LRAP situation in which the payor receives no benefit. Also, the 
mere fact that the LRAP takes the form of a recurrent allowance should 
not of itself prevent gift status. For example, if a wealthy patron were to 
support an artist by means of a fixed allowance, this should be excludible 
provided that no services are required in return. 
And yet if LRAP benefits were treated as gifts, the entire amounts 
would presumably be taxfree, including amounts reflecting loans for 
student living expenses. In view of the general resemblance of LRAPs to 
scholarships, it seems unlikely that a court would permit the limitations of 
I.R.C. § 117(b) to be circumvented in this way. Thus it appears that the 
only really good argument that LRAPs are not gifts is that they are 
227. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
228. Rev. Ru!. 78-46, 1978-1C.B.22 (waiving requirementto repay interim benefit 
of $3000 paid to surviving dependent of Jaw enforcement officer under the Public Safety 
Officers' Benefits Act after determination of ineligibility for final benefit of $50,000 for 
officers killed in the line of duty held taxfree because it was in the nature of relief 
payment for the purposes of general welfare). 
229. Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 8839026 (June 29, 1988) (holding waiver by Veterans 
Administration of taxpayer's repayment obligation of $15,784 on a defaulted VA-insured 
home mortgage pursuant to its authority to do so in hardship cases held tax-free, citing 
as support Rev. Ru!. 78-46.). 
230. Governmental aid to the poor is generally taxfree, such as Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children and foodstamps. Some commentators think the exclusion unjustified, 
however. See Jonathan Barry Forman, The Income Tax Treatment of Social Welfare 
Benefits, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 785 (1993). 
231. See BITIKER & LoKKEN, supra note 30, 110.2.2. 
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scholarships. This conclusion reinforces the analysis that LRAPs are 
excludible, because the government should not be able to have it both 
ways, denying gift status on the ground of preemption by I.R.C. § 117, 
and denying scholarship status on the ground of timing. If an LRAP is 
not a scholarship, it is a gift. 232 
H. Horizontal Equity 
It might be objected that from the point of view of the participant, the 
enjoyment of loan reduction or its cash equivalent is simply additional 
compensation for public interest employment. If LRAP participants are 
not taxed, co-workers who receive the same salary for the same work but 
no LRAP assistance will be overtaxed by comparison, thus violating 
horizontal equity. The argument has some merit, but it would apply 
equally well to many other tax benefits which are fully justifiable even 
though they are not evenly distributed. 
LRAP payments, even as cash grants, cannot be considered 
compensation from the public interest employer because the employer 
neither receives them nor has any control over them. The employer 
cannot, for example, reduce the LRAP payments and put them to other 
uses such as hiring additional personnel. In many cases the employer 
could not pay the amounts to participants even if received directly because 
it would violate fixed salary scales governing much public employment. 
The horizontal equity argument thus boils down to whether the 
exclusion is unfair merely because it is not universal. This argument 
would call into question the fairness of I.R.C. § 117 itself, because not all 
students receive scholarships, and the same student might be eligible for 
quite different amounts at different institutions. If these inequalities do not 
offend horizontal equity, neither should the identical inequalities entailed 
by LRAPs. Scholarship status should not be denied to an LRAP just 
because not all schools offer them, or because those which do so offer 
them in varying amounts. 
Exclusion of public-service LRAPs for tuition loans is not only 
justifiable under existing law, it is good policy as well, because taxing 
them undercuts carefully targeted incentives to provide much-needed 
public services to the poor in favor of the far more diffuse public interest 
of the fisc. 
232. See generally Laura Duncan, Books Hit Back For Some Lucky Students, CHI. 
DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 11, 1992, at 3. At least one LRAP probably is excludible as a 
gift rather than a scholarship. The student body of the University of Minnesota Law 
School voted to establish an LRAP funded by its own surplus funds. This would appear 
to be a gift from fellow students rather than an institutional grant. 
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I. Compliance 
Because of the uncertainty as to whether LRAPs are taxable, and if 
so to what extent, compliance is probably very low in this area. As 
pointed out above, 233 some law schools report LRAP assistance on Form 
1099 and others do not. In principle, it is the recipient who must 
determine whether the assistance qualifies as a scholarship, and it seems 
likely that many participants simply do not report the assistance unless 
they receive a Form 1099. If the IRS would issue a clear ruling on the 
taxability of LRAPs it would then be in a position to insist upon 
compliance. 
The conclusions above suggest that LRAP assistance should be treated 
as a tax-free scholarship at least to the extent of amounts allocable to law 
school tuition loans. The IRS should issue a ruling to this effect, and then 
insist that law schools send Forms 1099 reflecting only such loan 
forgiveness or cash grants as may exceed the amount allocable to tuition. 
As matters now stand, it appears that some LRAP participants are 
overtaxed, and others undertaxed. If the IRS does not publish a ruling 
which exempts at the very least the LRAP amounts allocable to law school 
tuition, Congress should consider remedial legislation as it did following 
Revenue Ruling 73-256.234 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
LRAP benefits should be excludible from income under current I.R.C. 
§ 117 as scholarships to the extent they are a rebate of qualifying tuition 
and fees. Even apart from I.R.C. § 117, LRAPs (and scholarships 
generally) should be excludible on the ground that such price reductions 
do not properly belong in the tax base at all. The fact that the grantor 
233. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
234. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
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may place conditions on the scholarship or rebate should be irrelevant 
except to the extent such conditions provide a direct and measurable 
economic benefit to the grantor, as under current law governing the 
deductibility of charitable contributions. 235 
235. These conclusions do not apply to LRAPs which are provided directly by 
public interest employers to their own employees, however, such as the cash LRAP 
benefits provided by NAPIL to its own staff. This is because the recipient is providing 
employment services directly to the grantor, and the LRAP is in effect a nonqualifying 
fringe benefit. Even Senator Bumper's proposed legislation would not cover this 
situation. See 139 CONG. REC. 85647, 85649 (daily ed. May 6, 1993). 
I.R.C. § 127 which grants an exclusion of up to $5250 per year of employer-
provided educational assistance might apply, however, assuming that Congress reinstates 
I.R.C. § 127 which by its terms expired December 31, 1994. On the other hand, PLR 
8714035 provides some authority to the contrary on the issue of timing. See supra notes 
194-198 and accompanying text. 
